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Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of 
World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (lACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the 
rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of 
international law. Apart from their impact on general international law, 1 their case law has had 
significant spillover effects on international criminal law, 2 international refugee law,3 interna-
tional environmentallaw,4 the law of armed conflicts,S and the law of the sea.6 
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1 See Lucius Caflisch & Antonio Cans;ado T rindade, Les conventiom americaine et europeenne des droits de l'homme et 
Ie droit international general, 1 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (2004); Cesare Pitea, Inter-
pretation andApplication of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Broader Context of International Law: Myth 
or Reality?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CML LIBERTIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (Eva Brems & Yves Haeckeds., 2014). 
2 See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Meam: The Quasi-criminal Jurisdiction of 
the Human Rights Courts, 107 AJIL 1 (2013) (discussing primarily IACHR case law); SONJA C. GROVER, THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A PATHWAY TO IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2010) 
(focusing primarily on ECHR case law); see also Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 585 (2010). 
3 See, e.g., Helene Lambert, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees: Limits and 
Opportunities, 24 REFUGEESURV. Q. 39 (2005); UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCRMANUAL 
ON REFUGEE PROTECTION AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007); NUALA MOLE 
& CATHERINE MEREDITH, ASY'LUMAND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); ROBIN 
C. A. WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 179-82 (2010). 
4 See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, JACQUELINE PEEL, ADRIANA FABRA & RUTH MACKENZIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 775-89 (20ll); PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 271-315 (2009); Loukis Loucaides, Environmental Protection 
Through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2005 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL. 249; Ole W. Pedersen, 
European EnvironmentalHuman Rights andEnvironmentalRights: A Long Time Coming?, 21 GEO. INT'LENVTL. L. REv. 
73 (2008); DONALD ANTON & DINAH SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011). 
5 See, e.g., Philip Leach, The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 732, 758-59 (2008); REPARER LES VIOLATIONS GRAVES ET MASSIVES DES DROITS 
DE L'HOMME: LA COUR INTERAMERICAINE, PIONNIERE ET MODELE? [REPAIR SERIOUS AND MASSIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT, PIONEER AND MODEL?) (Elisabeth Lambert 
Abdelgawad & Kathia Martin-Chenut eds., 2010); Lixinski, supra note 2. 
6 See HirsiJamaa v. Italy, 20ll-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Jasmine Coppens, The Law of the Sea and Human Rights in 
the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 179. 
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Most of these spillovers into other areas of international law have been widely studied,? as 
has the question of states' compliance with the rulings of human rights tribunals. S By contrast, 
in this article we place institutions, rather than states, at the center of the analysis and move 
away from the debate about compliance that has dominated international law scholarship in 
recent years. 9 Instead, we explore another important spillover effect that has previously escaped 
detailed scholarly attention. 10 We show that as regional human rights courts, the ECHR and 
IACHRhave been undertaking a broader array of roles than those originally envisioned and that 
their recent case law reduces the monopoly power of parliaments to determine how to structure 
their judiciaries, at least on the assumption that states comply with their international human 
rights obligations. Compliance with, and the efficacy of, the ECHR and IACHR judgments is 
inescapably related to what these two courts say, or see themselves as being in a position to say, 
about institutional reform, and some questions about compliance and efficacy will inform our 
discussion below. But our primary focus is on what the coutts tell governments with respect 
to designing the judiciary (and not on orders that it gives the judiciary directly). Il 
More specifically, we examine the ways that the ECHR and IACHR have assessed the struc-
ture and functioning of domestic judicial systems and whether those regional courts have, in 
the process, consciously or unconsciously been advancing their own preferred conceptions of 
what a judicial system should look like. In other words, our goal is to identify the "judicial 
design agendas" of the ECHR and IACHR, with particular attention to questions concerning 
the separation of powers. 12 We are also especially interested in how the power of domestic 
coutts is affected by the activities of the ECHR and IACHR in this realm. These two regional 
human rights courts, by empowering judges and also themselves, have not only created better 
conditions for their own entrenchment but also democratic deficits that may only increase as 
they evolve into quasi-constitutional courts that are not subject to domestic checks and bal-
ances. 
Much of the thinking about the institutional design of state judiciaries is found between the lines 
in ECHR and IACHR decisions, but one can see instances in which these agendas come to the fore. 
7 See supra notes 1-6; see also Vassilis Tzevelekos, Revisiting the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and 
Potential: Obligations Erga Omnes, Hierarchy of Rules and the Principle of Due Diligence as the Basis for Further 
Humanisation, 6 ERASMUS L. REv. 62 (2013). 
8 See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRI-
BUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE (2013); Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Com-
parison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 35, 46 (2010); Joel 
P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with Interna-
tional Law, 11 CHI. J. INTL. L. 127 (2010). 
9 See also KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2013). 
10 See STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 46 (2005) (an early claim that the 
right to an independent and impartial tribunal in European Convention Article 6, infra note 16, includes both the 
individual human right aspect and the institutional aspect). AI; we show in part I, however, Article 6 is not the only 
"vehicle" for addressing institutional aspects of judicial power. 
lIOn the jurisprudence of the IACHR in giving orders directly to judges, and on the efficacy of such orders, see 
Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce Human 
Rights, 44 CORNELLINT'L L.J. 493, 495, 502 (2011) (arguing thatthe IACHR could increase compliance byengag-
ing judges more directly). 
12 See, e.g., Dragoljub Popovic, European Court of Human Rights and the Concept of Separation of Powers, in SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 194 (M. Prabhakar ed., 2008); David Kosar, Policing Separation 
of Powers: A New Role for the European Court of Human Rights?, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 33 (2012). 
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One example is the line of cases in which the IACHR considered whether administrative proceed-
ings could qualify as judicial proceedings for the purpose of meeting state obligations of offering 
adequate judicial protection under Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights13 
(American Convention). Other examples can be found in the cases where the remedies 
ordered by two courts have required institutional reforms. The IACHR has been bolder 
regarding the scope of remedies; 14 it has a broader mandate when it comes to reparations, 
and a specific provision in the American Convention requires states to change their leg-
islation to conform to the convention. Is Nevertheless, institutional change has also 
resulted from ECHR judgments under the European Convention on Human Rights I6 
(European Convention), initially through a series of individual judgments and, more 
recently, nonmonetary reparation orders17 and the so-called pilot judgments. IS For 
instance, France had to alter the role of advocates general in the Conseil d'etat and the 
Cout de cassation 19 as a result of the ECHR's Grand Chamber judgments in Kress v. France 
and Martinie v. France. 2o Turkey eventually abolished its National Security Courts alto-
gether under pressure from the ECHR. 21 Finally, many believe that the Blair government's 
constitutional reform that abolished the House of Lords' Appellate Committee as the top 
13 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]; see, e.g., Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184 (Aug. 6, 2008). The United States is the only country that signed but did not ratify or 
accede to the convention. 
14 See Fernando Basch, Leonardo Filippini, Ana Laya, Mariano Nino, Felicitas Rossi & Barbara Schreiber, The 
Effictiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to Its Functioning and 
Compliance with Its Decisions, 12 SURINT'LJ. ON HUM. RTS. 9, 15 (2010) (empirical research on remedies ordered 
by the IACHR between 2001 and 2006 indicates that institutional and legal reform represents 8 percent of all rem-
edies ordered by the IACHR). 
15 Article 2 of the American Convention, supra note 13, provides: 
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative 
or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and 
the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those 
rights or freedoms. 
16 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, ETS 
No.5, 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
17 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Struc-
tural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 125, 146-49 (2008). 
18 See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, Partneringwith Strasbourg: Constitutionalization of the European CourtofHuman Rights, 
the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, 9 HUM. RTS. L. 
REv. 397 (2009); Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J, 1231 (2011); DOMINIK HAIDER, THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PRO-
CEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (regarding the pilot judgments). 
19 See Decret n° 2009-14 du 7 janvier 2009 relatif au rapporteur public des juridictions administratives et au 
deroulement de l'audience devant ces juridictions, at http://www.textes.justice.gouv.frldecrets-l01811. 
20 See Kress v. France, 200l-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Grand Chamber); Martinie v. France, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
41 (Grand Chamber); see also Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. L. REv. 
183 (2008) (for an overview of development ofECHR case law on this issue); Mitchel Lasser, The European Pas-
teurization of French Law, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1032 (2005); Koen Lemmens. But see Pasteur Was French: Com-
ments on Mitchel Lasser's 'The European Pasteurization of French Law, 'in THE LEGITIMACY OF HIGHEST COURTS 
RULINGS: JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND BEYOND 171 (Nick Huls, Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 
2009); F recieric S udre, Comeil d'etat et Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme: Vers la normalisation des relations entre 
Ie Conseil d'etat et la Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme, 22 REVUE FRAN~AISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIVE 286 
(2006) (for critical positions). 
21 See section "Military Courts and Special Tribunals" in part 1. 
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court in the United Kingdom was triggered by the ECHR's interpretation of the right to 
a fair triaF2 
This article charts how the ECHR and IACHR have come believe that domestic judiciaries 
need to be structured in order to satisfy the requirements of the European and American Con-
ventions-a task that moves the courts well beyond specific determinations of whether the 
rights of particular individuals under those two conventions have been violated (and, if so, what 
remedies are appropriate). We believe that this involvement of the ECHR and IACHR in 
domestic institutional design issues has gone largely unnoticed. More specifically, we argue 
that the two courts have increased the power of domestic courts by delving into institutional 
design and that, by the same actions, the two courts have increased their own power. Three 
mechanisms seem to contribute to this refashioning of domestic and international judicial 
power. The first one is that ECHR and IACHR have a broader understanding of what judicial 
power is than many member states and that this broader understanding has led the courts to 
judicialize new areas of law. Second, both courts also prioritize judicial independence over 
other judicial virtues, with the consequence that the courts' judgments have challenged the pri-
macy of the legislature in lawmaking, which has altered, in turn, the domestic separation of 
powers. Finally, both courts affect the internal architecture of domestic judiciaries byendors-
ing the unification of court administration and also by empowering lower court judges, which 
alters hierarchical power structures within the domestic judiciaries themselves. 
The analysis of the article centers on the case law of the ECHR and IACHR, and looks at 
judgments both in contentious cases (ECHR and IACHR) and advisory opinions (IACHR 
only). We chose these two human rights courts for three reasons: they address similar sets of 
issues stipulated by treaties with reasonably similar textual bases; their case law is sufficiently 
developed; and their judgments have similar normative weight. Another factor is that the 
ECHR's judgments affect both established and developing democracies, whereas the IACHR's 
judgments concern primarily developing democracies. 23 This factor enables us to examine 
whether the maturity of democracies affects the standards employed by international human 
rights bodies. Therefore, even though we do touch on the consequences of our findings beyond 
the European and inter-American systems, we do not study the case law of the other established 
regional human rights court-the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights-which was 
only recently established and whose case law yet to develop enough for stable trends to be iden-
tified. We also exclude quasi-judicial human rights bodies, such as the Human Rights Com-
mittee, because their decisions have different normative weight, and the Court ofJ ustice of the 
European Union, because doing so would raise issues that are not overly relevant for interna-
tionallaw more broadly. Finally, we leave aside other specialized fields of international law, 
such as international arbitration, for they raise different issues stemming from textually dif-
ferent documents. 24 
22 See, e.g., David Hope, The Refonn o/the House o/Lords, 60 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 
257, paras. 1.4, 3.1-.3; see also Diana Woodhouse, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005-DeftndingJudicial Inde-
pendence the English Way, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 153, 154 (2007). 
23 We are aware, of course, that the twenty states that have opted to accept the IACHR's contentious jurisdiction 
in accordance with American Convention Article 62 vary greatly in their levels of economic development and insti-
tutionalization of democracy. 
24 One may persuasively argue that the European Union is unique in so many respects-especially because it 
comprises only liberal democracies-that the findings regarding this supranational judicial system are no transfer-
rable to other contexts. 
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A thorough study of whether ECHR and IACHR recommendations are implemented 
domestically is also beyond the scope of this article. We mention examples of domestic imple-
mentation merely to show the potential ofECHR and IACHR judgments to shape domestic 
judicial design, but we do not comprehensively analyze the actual compliance with those judg-
ments or the factors influencing compliance. That is, our aim is to weave the "master narrative" 
that emerges from the two courts' judgments on judicial design rather than study the level of 
acceptance of this narrative among the states. Nevertheless, although we present to systematic 
assessment of efficacy, this article shows that many decisions of both courts regarding domestic 
judicial design have had an impact. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the case law of the ECHR and IACHR 
with regard to three sets of judicial design issues. It focuses primarily on issues addressed by 
both courts but also identifies areas where one court went significantly further than the other. 
Part II compares the judicial design agendas of the ECHR and IACHR, and then discusses how 
and to what extent the two courts define the contours of the" optimal judiciary." The conclu-
sion, part III, summarizes our argument and discusses the potential consequences, intended 
and unintended, of the courts' following their current agendas for judicial design. 
I. DOMESTIC JUDICIAL DESIGN ISSUES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COURTS 
Human rights courts were not originally endowed with the competence to tell states how 
to structure their judiciaries. To be sure, the texts of both the American25 and the European26 
Conventions do establish certain minimal rights that need to be protected through judicial 
institutions, but they do not provide detailed mandates to states regarding the specifics ofinsti-
tutional design. The relevant provisions state that individuals have particular rights but not that 
states have the obligation to protect those rights in any specific manner. 27 But the ECHR and 
IACHR have deemed those details to be a fundamental part of their mandates; the assumption 
has been that ordering adjustments to state structures has been necessary in order to provide 
the best possible recommendations to states for protecting human rights within their territo-
nes. 
The main gateway through which the IACHR can impose certain requirements on domestic 
judiciaries is the principle of the "natural judge,"28 which is considered to be an essential aspect 
25 See American Convention, supra note 13, Arts. 8, 25. 
26 See European Convention, supra note 16, Arts. 5,6, 13. 
27 One notable exception is Article 25(2) of the American Convention, supra note 13, which reads: 
The States Parties undertake: 
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the state; 
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and 
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
28 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF JUDGES, LAWYERS AND PROSECUTORS 7-11 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the meaning of 
the principle of the "natural judge" (sometimes also referred to as the principle of the "legal judge") varies from one country 
to another); see also PHILIP M. LANGBROEK & MARCO FABRI, THE RIGHT JUDGE FOR EACH CASE: A STUDY OF 
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of the right to a fair trial. 29 Under that principle, no cases shall be heard by a tribunal established 
after the facts of the case; the judge hearing the case must be competent, impartial and inde-
pendent;30 and the tribunal must act "in accordance with the procedure established by law for 
hearing and deciding cases submitted to it."31 The principle also forbids states from creating 
new tribunals to replace the jurisdiction that would normally correspond to ordinary courts. 32 
Notably, the principle is sufficiently open-ended that the lACHR can use it to impose upon 
states its own vision of an effective judiciary. 
The ECHR has not come up with an equivalent overarching principle, though the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal similarly has served as the main "vehicle" for bringing judicial 
design issues to the fore.33 More recently, however, the ECHR has found itself addressing structural 
issues affecting domestic judiciaries in the context of cases alleging violations of non-judicially ori-
ented articles of the European Convention (as has the lACHR, albeit to a lesser extent, under the 
American Convention). How is that possible? The key to understanding this phenomenon is the 
identity of the applicant. In the last few years, domestic judges have started to bring individual appli-
cations about alleged violations of their own rights-situations that raise considerations beyond the 
right to a fair trial. The judges have invoked, among other rights, the rights to freedom of expres-
sion,34 to freedom of religion,35 and to respect for private and family life.36 
The key insight to be drawn from the case law of the ECHRand lACHR is that human rights 
courts' understanding of a judiciary is broader than what the internal constitutional processes of 
states consider to be a judiciary. In other words, regional human rights courts, in an attempt to 
ensure that their mandates cover a wider range of situations, end up scrutinizing structures that 
CAsE AsSIGNMENT AND IMPARTIALITY IN SIX EUROPEAN JuDICIARIES (2007) (noting that this concept thus may 
set different requirements in different countries, with the most stringent set applicable in Germany). 
29 American Convention, supra note 13, para. 8. 
30 Berenson Mejia v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 119, para. 144 (Nov. 
25,2004); Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 114, para. 118 (Sept. 7, 2004); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 52, para. 131 (May 30,1999); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) 
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.8, para. 
30 (Jan. 30, 1987); Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on 
Human Rights),AdvisoryOpinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct'. H.R. (ser.A) No.9, para. 20 (Oct. 6,1987) (allrequir-
ing the intervention of an independent and impartial judicial organ, having the power to determine the lawfulness 
of measures adopted in a state of emergency). 
31 Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 107, para. 169 (July 2, 2004); Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 74, para. 112 (Feb. 6, 2001); Constitutional Courtv. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.7!, para. 77 (Jan. 31, 2001); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, paras. 130-31; Judicial 
Guarantees in States of Emergency, supra note 30, para. 20. 
32 Berenson Mejia v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 143; Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 129; 19 Mer-
chants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, para. 165 (July 5, 2004); 
Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 96, para. 51 (Nov. 26, 2002); 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, in Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 58, UN Doc.NCONF.121122/Rev.1 (1985) (confirmed by GA Res. 40/32 
(Nov. 29, 1985) and GA Res. 401146 (Dec. 13, 1985». 
33 For a succinct summary of relevant ECHR jurisprudence, see TRECHSEL, supra note 10, at 45-80, and KUI-
JER, supra note 22, at 171-382. 
34 See, e.g., Wille v. Liechtenstein, 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 279; Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 2009). 
35 See, e.g., Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), App. No. 47936/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 8,2001). 
36 See, e.g., Ozpinarv. Turkey, App. No. 20999/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 19,2010). FortheIACHR, seeAtalaRiffO 
v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
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domestically are not necessarily seen as judicial. Hence, both courts, directly or indirectly, contrib-
ute to the expansion of judicial power at the expense of other political institutions and to the judi-
cialization of new areas oflaw. They also prioritize judicial independence over other judicial virtues 
and indirectly challenge the primacy of the legislature in lawmaking. By doing so, they promote 
shifts in domestic (inter-branch) separation of powers. Finally, regional human rights courts, by pre-
scribing unified standards of court administration and empowering lower court judges, also affect 
the internal architecture of domestic judiciaries (intra-branch separation of powers). 
In order to address these phenomena, we analyze three subsets of issues dealt with by inter-
national human rights courts. We first examine the case law on military and special courts to 
show that both courts interpret "judicial power" more broadly than domestic constitutions. 
We then focus on cases concerning the disciplining and removal of judges to show how 
regional human rights courts- by interpreting the notion of judicial independence-affect 
the domestic separation of powers and sometimes even push for a uniform model of court 
administration. We have chosen this set of cases because it has allowed human rights courts to 
connect individual human rights violations to the inner workings of the judiciary (after all, the 
victims are judges) much more tightly. And this tight connection has paved the way for more 
structure-oriented (as opposed to rights-oriented) analyses by the relevant courts. As indicated 
above, these cases have also allowed for the extension of institutional design issues beyond the 
confines of the right to a fair trial. In this category of cases, we do not deal with individual 
instances of abusing discretion but with cases that have strucrural implications for the man-
agement of other cases. 
Finally, we analyze how both courts interpret the concept of "law," and inquire what status 
and normative effects they give to decisions of domestic courts. The ECHR, by elevating judi-
cial decisions to the status of the source onaw on a par with statutory law, is empowering the 
judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature and further shifting the separation of powers. By contrast, the 
lACHR seems to be taking a more conservative approach to the meaning of "law," and tells us 
that domestic judgments are not law (except in common-law countries, which are practically 
absent from the lACHR's docket). The Court suggests, however, that its own judgments are. 
This move treads an unsteady line between being conservative toward judicial power in civil-
law countries and progressive regarding the lACHR's own influence over judicial power. 
Due to the vast number of issues addressed by both the ECHR and lACHR, we further nar-
rowed our analysis and focused primarily on issues that have been presented before both 
courts-which, in our opinion, provides us with the optimal environment for comparison. In 
this part of the article,37 we hereby exclude judicial design issues that are not part of both the 
European and Latin-American legal traditions38 or that have been raised before only one of 
these two courts.39 
37 We revisit some of these issues in the first two sections of part II to show that the judicial design issues that 
have been addressed by both the ECHR and IACHR represent only a small sample of the wide-ranging prescriptions 
that these two courts have made for domestic judiciaries. 
38 The rypical examples of judicial design issues that fall within this category are the role of advocates general and 
the incompatibiliry of the judicial office with other functions that are not part of Latin American tradition and that 
were therefore not challenged before the IACHR. By contrast, these issues have been heavily contested before the 
ECHR. See supra notes 19 -20 and accompanying text (regarding advocates genera!); Kosar, supra note 12, at 41-46 
(regarding incompatibiliry with the judicial function). 
39 That is why we omit, for instance, a long strand of the ECHR's case law on improper case assignment and the 
role of court presidents; the IACHR has no equivalent case law. 
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Military Courts and Special Tribunals 
One common issue that human rights courts are asked to address is the appropriate forum 
for hearing particular cases. Given that the term tribunal used by both the Arrierican Conven-
tion (Article 8) and European Convention (Article 6) in defining the right to a fair trial is some-
what vague, the courts have taken it upon themselves to determine what constitutes a tribunal 
capable of administering justice in any particular case.40 
For the IACHR, these issues have arisen primarily in deciding between military and civilian 
justice systems. In a set of cases against Peru, the IACHR was asked to determine whether civil-
ians accused of engaging in terrorist activities could be tried by military courts (which Peru 
argued was necessary due to the national security issues surrounding the cases). Consistently, 
the Court said that, while it was in principle possible to use military jurisdictio~s in terrorism 
cases (because of the sensitive nature of the charges), the cases would still be subject to the same 
fair trial requirements as civilian jurisdictions. Depriving the defense of access to documents 
and not allowing sufficient time to prepare were thus, in two cases,.considered violations offair 
trial rights.41 These two cases were the first in which the IACHRanalyzed questions of judicial 
design in relation to military courts.42 
In a series of cases separate from the above-which concerned the rights of civilian defln-
dantswithin the military justice system-the IACHR considered the question of military juris-
diction from the prosecution side. In particular, do military courts provide an adequate forum 
for providing remedies to victims of human rights violations? The IACHR curbed the juris-
diction of military courts, holding that military judges could entertain cases only against mil-
itary personnel and, even then, only with respect to acts that were, by their nature, related to 
military affairs. Attacks against civilians were considered to fall outside this category, and mil-
itary personnel involved in human rights violations against civilians (in particular, massacres) 
were to be judged by civilian judicial authorities.43 In Cesti Hurtado, the IACHR went even fur-
ther. The victim was a retired military officer who was tried before military tribunals after his 
40 We agree with T rechsel that the ECHR's various definitions of the term tribunal have not become important 
factors in the case law and that the" essential point is that the [ECHR] does not give much importance to the [domes-
tic] label which is attached to the institutions that function as a court." TRECHSEL, supra note 10, at 48. 
41 Lori Berenson Mejia v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 167; Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 69, para. 127 (Aug. 18,2000); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 148. 
42 The cases involving enforced disappearances in Honduras, the very first ones before the IACHR, did not raise 
such issues, as there was no question whether the prosecutions would be pursued before ordinary courts. 
43 Santo Domingo Massacrev. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 259, para. 158 (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Durand y Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
68, paras. 116-17, 125, 126 (Aug. 16,2000); Cantoral Benavidesv. Peru, supra note 41, paras. 112-14; Las Palm-
eras v. Colombia, supra note 32, paras. 51-53; 19 Merchantsv. Colombia, supra note 32, paras. 165-67, 173-74; 
Lori Berenson Mejia v. Peru, supra note 30, paras. 141-45; "Mapiripan Massacre" v. Colombia, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 134, para. 202 (Sept. 15,2005); Palamara Iribarnev. Chile, Merits, 
Reparations and COSts, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, paras. 139, 143 (Nov. 22, 2005); Pueblo Bello Mas-
sacrev. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, paras. 189, 193 (Jan. 31, 
2006); Montero Atanguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, paras. 53-54, 108 (July 5,2006); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, para. 142 (Nov. 29, 2006); La RochelaMassacrev. Colombia, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163, para. 200 (May 11, 2007); Escue Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, 
Reparations and COSts, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165, para. 105 (July 4, 2007); Zambrano Velezv. Ecuador, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 166, para. 66 (July 4,2007); Tiu Tojin v. Gua-
temala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, paras. 118-20 (Nov. 26, 2008); Us6n 
Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
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retirement for acts unrelated to military service committed after his retirement from military 
service. The IACHR determined that the trial before a military tribunal was in violation of the 
. Arrierican Convention and ordered that the proceedings be annulled.44 The military courts did 
not have jurisdiction over acts not committed by military personnel (either active or on reserve) 
or for acts unrelated to military service. 
In the two sets of cases discussed above, along with Cesti Hurtado, the IACHR significantly 
narrowed the scope of specialized jurisdictions, determining that, whenever a civilian was 
involved on either side of a case, those jurisdictions were likely inappropriate, except potentially 
insofar as they worked exactly like general courts. 
The implication of these cases is that, according to the IACHR, military courts are considered 
tribunals to which the Arrierican Convention requirements for fair trial, as set forth in Article 
8, apply. This result has important repercussions for domestic judiciaries. The key consequence 
of the first set of cases (about the rights of defendants) is that military courts must be restruc-
tured so that they meet the criteria applicable to ordinary courts. This requirement indirectly 
undercuts the very existence of military courts, however, as one may plausibly argue that, if 
military courts must provide the same guarantees as ordinary courts, a separate system of mil-
itary courts is not needed. The second set of cases (about the need for the injured to obtain 
redress), coupled with Cesti Hurtado, reinforces this view by narrowing the jurisdiction of mil-
itary courts even further. In particular, military courts have the capacity to try Civilians only in 
very narrow circumstances (in which case they must provide the defendants with the same guar-
antees as ordinary courts) and to try military personnel only when the case meets certain con-
ditions (for example, acts related to military service). If we add the potential complications of 
jurisdictional disputes between ordinary and military courts-which any state wants to 
avoid-the very raison d'etre of military courts is put into question. 
In other cases the IACHR has brought various constitutional courts and bodies- ones that 
were never considered part of judicial power of national systems-under the fair trial require-
ments of Arrierican Convention Article 8. These cases include Constitutional Court,45 
YATAAiA.,46 Castaneda Gutman,47 and Lopez Mendoza. 48 Constitutional Court involved the 
impeachment of constitutional justices by the Peruvian Congress. More specifically, three jus-
tices of the Peruvian Constitutional Court were impeached over their refusal to endorse a piece 
oflegislation being pushed through by then presidenrAlberto Fujimori. This law, which called 
itself an "authoritative interpretation" of certain provisions of the Peruvian Constitution, 
207, paras. 108 -1 0 (Nov. 20, 2009); Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, paras. 272-73 (Nov. 23, 2009); Fernandez Ortega v. Mexico, Pre-
liminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, para. 176 (Aug. 30, 
2010); Rosendo Cantu v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-.Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 216, para. 160 (Aug. 31, 2010); Caso Cabrera Garda v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, paras. 197-99 (Nov. 26, 2010); Velez Restrepo v. Colom-
bia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 248, para. 240 (Sept. 
3,2012). 
44 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 56, para. 194 (Sept. 29, 1999). 
45 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 3l. 
46 YAT AMA v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 127 (June 23, 2005). 
47 Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13. 
48 L6pez Mendoza v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 233 (Sept. 1, 
2011). 
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would essentially allow Fujimori to run for a third consecutive term. Given the apprehensions 
of several Constitutional Court justices that the law violated the Constitution, they were dis-
missed before they could give judgment on the case. The question of their dismissal was deter-
mined by the Peruvian Congress, the organ with the authority to remove Constitutional Court 
justices. 
The IACHR, using ECHR precedents, said that even political trials were subject to the due 
process requirements contained in the American Convention;49 that is, the Peruvian Congress 
would need to be follow court-like procedures in order to undertake political trials. This pro-
cedural requirement brings judicial processes centrally into play during impeachment proce-
dures, which are, by nature, political processes. Second, the IACHR conveyed the message that 
removal of the Constitutional Court justices must meet the same criteria as the removal of ordi-
nary judges, and hence treated the both types of courts alike. 50 
The IACHR applied the same app roach to electoral courts. In Castaneda Gutman it consid-
ered the high-profile case of an independent candidate for the Mexican presidency who was 
prevented from running in the 2006 presidential election.51 The caSe revolved around whether 
there were internal remedies for determining the political rights ofJ orge Castaneda Gutman. 52 
In this case, Castaneda, after being notified that he was not qualified to run for president, 
appealed to the Mexican courts through a general writ of amparo, 53 as opposed to appealing 
to the electoral courts. 54 The problem, however, was that Mexican law excluded electoral rights 
from the scope of amparo. The IACHR said that it was, in principle, permissible for states to 
exclude certain rights from amparo- but only if remedies of an equivalent nature and scope 
were available for those human rights excluded from the writ. 55 
The IACHR analyzed both the access to, and effectiveness of, an available remedy under 
Mexican electoral law. 56 It determined that one of the necessary requirements for the effec-
tiveness of a remedy was that it could review legislation with respect to both the Mexican Con-
stitution and the American Convention ("control de convencionalidad," or control of conven-
tionality,57 to be discussed further below in the section "Judicial Lawmaking"). The power of 
judicial review was, in this context, deemed essential for the existence of an effective remedy,58 
and because the electoral court was not designed to take into account Castaneda's political 
rights as protected by the Mexican Constitution and American Convention, it could not be 
considered an effective remedy. 59 The IACHR determined that Mexico had to modify its elec-
toral court system in order to guarantee that those courts could review the legality of all acts 
under their jurisdiction against the Constitution and the American Convention.60 
49 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, para. 77. 
50 Id. 
51 Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13. 
52 Id., para. 2. 
53 A writ of amparo, typical of Spanish-American countries, is a general remedy for cases concerning the denial 
of human rights. 
54 Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13, para. 77. 
55 Id., para. 92. 
56 !d., para. 103. 
57 Id., para. 129. 
58 !d., para. 130. 
59 !d., para. 133. 
60 Id., paras. 227-31. 
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Mexico promptly did so, and, in its order reviewing compliance with the judgment, the 
IACHR noted that states' duties under the American Convention extended not only to sub-
. stantive norms on fundamental rights but also to procedural norms, and it welcomed a reform 
in Mexico requiring electoral courts to take into account the IACHR's jurisprudence.61 The 
institutional lesson of this judgment is similar to that of the Constitutional Court case. Electoral 
courts are considered "tribunals" within the meaning of American Convention and thus must 
meet the same requirements as ordinary courts. 
Nevertheless, Constitutional Court and Castaneda Gutman were still about courts and the 
judiciary writ large. In the YAT Ali1A. case, the IACHR went further and subjected a nonjudicial 
body to the same requirements as ordinary courts. The Supreme Electoral Council of 
Nicaragua had refused to allow candidates of the YATAMA party to participate in forth-
coming elections, and the IACHR was asked to consider whether the council was subject 
to the fair trial requirements guaranteed by Article 8 of the American Convention. The 
Court found that, to the extent that the Supreme Electoral Council was in a position to 
issue decisions that affected human rights protected by the American Convention (in this 
case, political rights), it is subject to the requirements of Article 8.62 This case thus shows 
that the IACHR has a broader understanding of what judicial power is than some of the 
signatory states to the American Convention. In other words, once a special body is given 
the authority to decide on fundamental rights enshrined in the American Convention, it 
is treated as a "tribunal" and must meet all the procedural guarantees required for ordinary 
courts. This result sounds natural from the human rights point of view, but in institutional 
terms it means that these special bodies must become court-like, as a consequence of which 
the disputes that they decide become fully judicialized. 
In Lopez Mendoza, the IACHR pushed the definition of tribunal and the institutional con-
straints upon tribunals law even further. In the Court's view, "all bodies which exercise func-
tions of a judicial nature, whether criminal or not, have a duty to adopt fair decisions based in 
the full respect for the guarantees of due process established in Article 8 of the American Con-
vention."63 This case concerned a local politician in Venezuela who was denied the right to run 
in a mayoral election. In analyzing whether the electoral commission's procedures were in 
accordance with those Article 8 guarantees, the Court determined that with regard to such 
issues, administrative proceedings such as those of the commission were subject to the same 
type of scrutiny as the "normal" judiciary. The IACHR said that the commission had a duty 
to give reasons for decisions of this kind (as with all judicial decisions) and that this duty was 
integral to the right to defense;64 under Article 23(2) of the American Convention, the right 
to participate in government may be restricted only by "a competent court in criminal pro-
ceedings," thereby requiring the full due process protections of Article 8. The Court required 
Venezuela to change its electoral law so as to comply with the requirements of the American 
Convention.65 In other words, the Court determined that a specialized jurisdiction must pro-
vide the full due process protections as ordinary courts. As with the case law on military courts, 
61 Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, at 3, 4 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
Aug. 28, 2013) ("Considering," paras. 5, 9). 
62 YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, paras. 149-50. 
63 Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48, para. Ill. 
64 Id, para. 149. 
65 Id, para. 206. 
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this judgment challenges the existence of specialized electoral courts, and suggests that, even 
if they are allowed to exist, they need to be set up and behave exactly like ordinary courts. They 
would need to be fully transparent and independent, providing full hearings and rights to 
defense. They would also need to take international human rights standards into account (and 
provide full remedies against the violation of those rights), which can be seen as reinforcing the 
power of human rights courtS.66 
Like the IACHR, the ECHR has spent significant time and resources on reviewing the design 
and jurisdiction of military and other special courts, as well quasi-judicial bodies. These issues 
were mostly addressed in Turkish and British cases.67 The prime example is the series of cases 
involving the Turkish National Security Courts. The Turkish National Security Courts were 
nonmilitary courts68 established by the 1973 constitutional amendment to deal with crimes 
against Turkey's territorial or national integrity, democratic order, or national security. They 
were mixed courts comprising civilian and military judges and had jurisdiction over civilians. 
Even though the three-judge panels always included two civilian judges, the ECHR found this 
system incompatible with the right to an independent and impartial court guaranteed by Arti-
cle 6 of the European Convention. It recognized that, when sitting as members of National 
Security Courts, "military judges enjoy constitutional safeguards identical to those of civilian 
judges[.] ... [T]hey may not be removed from office or made to retire early without their con-
sent['] ... and no public authority may give them instructions concerning their judicial activ-
ities or influence them in the performance of their duties."69 But it also noted that they "are 
servicemen who still belong to the army .... [T]hey remain subject to military disci-
pline .... Decisions pertaining to their appointment are to a great extent taken by the admin-
istrative authorities and the army. Lastly, their term of office as National Security Court judges 
is only four years and can be renewed. "70 
The ECHR explicitly rejected the argument concerning expertise-namely, that the justi~ 
fication for the presence of military judges in the National Security Courts was their compe-
tence and experience in the battle against organized crime71-and concluded that "the appli-
cant could legitimately fear that because one of the judges of the izmir National Security Court 
was a military judge it might allow itself to be unduly influenced by considerations which had 
nothing to do with the nature of the case."72 In the wake of this decision, military judges can 
no longer sit on criminal trials against civilians, and the impact of this series of cases on the 
institutional design of the Turkish judiciary was far-reaching. Military judges were removed 
from the National Security Courts' panels in 1999, and the National Security Courts were 
66 We discuss this phenomenon in more detail in part II. 
67 The applications concerning military courts were lodged against other countries, too. Most of these c~ses, how-
ever, are either old or decided by the European Commission of Human Rights, not the ECHR. See Maszm v. Roma-
nia, App. No. 59892/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2006) (an exception to these cases). 
68 Incal v. Turkey, 1998-N Eur. Ct. H.R. 1547, paras. 65-73 (Grand Chamber). 
69 Id., para. 67 (cross-references omitted). 
70 Id., para. 68 (cross-references omitted). 
71 Id., para. 70. Note that in the Incal judgment itself, the Grand Chamber refused to consider this argument in 
abstracto, id., but the chamber judgment in Ciraklar v. Turkey did so just four months later: "It is understandable 
that a civilian ... should be apprehensive about being tried by a bench of three judges which includes a regular army 
officer .... " <;::iraklar v. Turkey, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3059, para. 39. 
72 Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, para. 72. 
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abolished in 2004.73 What we see here is the ECHR's capacity to require a signatory state to 
change the composition of such courts, eventually leading to their elimination (which, in turn, 
increases the authority of ordinary courts). 
Given the stance of the ECHR toward the National Security Courts-even when civilian 
judges were in the majority-it is not surprising that the ECHR also found that when trying 
civilians, the Turkish military courts, whose five-judge panels included only two civilian judges 
(the remaining three members being an army officer and two military judges) were also in vio-
lation of the right to a fair trial?4 Turkey eventually accepted this reasoning, and the compe-
tence of military courts to try civilians, except in times of war, was abolished in 2009,75 Like 
the IACHR,76 the ECHR thus de facto ruled that military courts must meet the same require-
ments as civilian courts if they are to try civilians-which undermines the very need to have 
a separate system of military courts. 
The ECHR's case law also went beyond the mere determination of the ratione personae juris-
diction of military courts and pronounced on military courts' structure and jurisdiction over 
military officers. In its earlier case law, the ECHR had accepted the participation of military 
judges on the Turkish Supreme Military Administrative Court, which decides primarily civil 
claims brought by military personnel regarding acts and omissions of the Ministry of Defense. 
Similarly, the ECHR had held that the majority of military judges on the panel of the then 
Dutch Supreme Military Court (comprising two civilian judges and four military judges), in 
a case involving offenses against military discipline, met the requirements of the right to a fair 
trial.
77 
However, in a more recent line of case law on British courts-martial, the ECHR inten-
sified its review and made clear its institutional choices. In Findlay it held that, because of the 
multiple roles played in general courts-martial by the "convening officer," those proceedings 
did not satisfy the requirements of the right to a fair trial. 78 In such proceedings the convening 
officer not only played a key prosecuting role but appointed the members of the court-martial, 
had the power to dissolve it, and acted as a "confirming officer" who ratified the decision of 
the court-martial (prior to which the decision was not final). 
73 Not~ that in 20?4, the National Security Courts were transformed into Specially Empowered Courts, which 
we~e ~bohshed only In 2014. See Law no. 6526, Fifth Judicial Package (amending Anti-terrorism Act, Code of 
Cnr~llnal Procedure and other laws, entered into effect March 6, 2014) (Turkey); Directorate General for EU 
~f~lrs [Turkey), The Fifth Judicial Reform Package, at http://www.abgm.adalet.gov.trleng/absurecindeturkyargisi/ 
JudlCalr~formfthefifty.html; Hande Ozhabe§, Assessment on C~anges Regarding the Specially Empowered Judicial 
System In Turkey (Apr. 2014), at http://tesev.org.trlen/yaYIn/assessment-on-changes-regarding-the-specially-
empowered-judicial-system-in-turkey/. 
74 See $ahiner v. Turkey, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, paras. 33-47. In fact, the ECHR went even further and 
held that the "fact that two civilian judges, whose independence and impartiality are not in doubt, sat in that court 
makes no diffirence in this respect." Id., para. 46 (emphasis added); see also Alfath v. Turkey (regarding the applicant 
MahmutMemduh Uyan),App. No. 32984/96, paras. 34-46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2003); Ahmet Kor;:v. Turkey, 
App. No. 32580/96, para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 22, 2004). 
75 The competence to try military personnel for nonmilitary offenses was also restricted. See Turkey Military 
Court Law Passed, BBC NEWS (July 9,2009), a http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8142257.stm. 
76 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
77 The Turkish case is Yavuzv. Turkey (dec.),App. No. 29870/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May25, 2000), and the Dutch 
case is Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 89 (1976) (Grand Chamber). 
78 Findlay v. United Kingdom, 1997-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, paras. 74-78; see also Coyne v. United Kingdom, 
1997-VEur. Ct. H.R. 1842, para. 58; Cablev. United Kingdom, App. No. 24436/94, para. 21 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 
18,1999); Wilkinson v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31145/96, 35580/97, para. 24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2001); 
Mills v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35685/97, para. 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 5, 2001). 
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In the wake of these decisions about courts-martial, the United Kingdom revamped its system 
of military courts and abolished the posts of" convening officer" and" confirming officer. "79 Under 
the new model, a court-martial included the Permanent President of Courts Martial (an army lieu-
tenant colonel due to remain in his post for four years until his retirement), a legally qualified civilian 
judge advocate, and two captains. But this institutional change still did not satisfy the ECHR, 
which, in Morris v. United Kingdom, found the new model also in violation of the right to a fair 
trial.80 The ECHR scrutinized all institutional features of the revamped courts-martial and held 
that, while considering the permanent president to be a "significant guarantee of independence" 
and the presence of the judge advocate to be an "important guarantee," these safeguards and others 
(for example, rules on eligibility for selection and the oath taken by members) were considered insuf-
ficient to exclude the risk of outside pressure being brought to bear on the ordinary officer members; 
they were appointed on an ad hoc basis,81 were of relatively junior rank,82 had no legal training, and 
remained subject to army discipline and reports.83 This holding de facto meant that military courts 
must meet the same requirements as civilian courts not only if they try civilians but also if they try 
military officers. Again, Morris effectively questioned the raison d'etre of military tribunals and 
again pushed them toward being much more like ordinary courts. 
Less than two years later, the Grand Chamber stepped in and revisited these issues in the 
Cooper84 and Grieves cases. 85 The ECHR eventually found no violation of the principle of judi-
cial independence in Cooper, 86 which concerned the UK air force court-martial system. It dis-
tinguished the air force system from the army system reviewed in Morris on the narrow ground 
that the lack of legal training of the two "ordinary" members of the Royal Air Force court-
martial-a flight lieutenant and a squadron leader-was compensated for by the directions 
given by the judge advocate and by the briefing notes drawn up by the Royal Air Force's Courts 
MartialAdministration Unit. 87 The Grand Chamber reached a contrary result in Grieves, how-
ever, which concerned the Royal Navy court-martial system.88 The navy system differed from 
the air force system in the following respects: the post of the permanent president did not exist 
in the naval system; judge advocates were serving naval officers instead of civilians; and the 
briefing notes were less detailed. 89 Although the government argued that these differences were 
justified because of the particulars of naval service,90 the Grand Chamber was unpersuaded and 
decided the case against the government. 
79 See Armed Forces Act 1996 (UK). 
80 Morris v. United Kingdom, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 387, paras. 59-72. 
81 !d., para. 70. 
82 Id., para. 72. 
83 Id. The ECHR also made clear that "the position of the military members of the court martial cannot generally 
be compared with that of a member of a civilian jury, who is not open to the risk of such pressures." Id. 
84 Cooper v. United Kingdom, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 145 (Grand Chamber). 
85 Grieves v. United Kingdom, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 247 (Grand Chamber). 
86 Cooper v. United Kingdom, supra note 84, paras. 105-34. The concurring opinion of] udge Costa attests that 
it was a close call. 
87 Id., paras. 123-25. The Grand Chamber also took into account that the members of a court-martial cannot 
be reported on in relation to their judicial decision making. 
88 Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, paras. 74-91. 
89 Id., paras. 81-82, 85-90. 
90 See the United Kingdom's argument in Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, para. 88. 
2015] DOMESTIC JUDICIAL DESIGN BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 727 
Based on Cooper and Grieves, serving military officers cannot sit on military courts (as they 
could be subject to discipline and reports); the presence of a civilian and a permanent military 
judge on the military bench is required; and all members of military courts, including the ordi-
nary members, must either have legal qualifications or be properly instructed by an experienced 
lawyer (as their lack oflegal qualifications would otherwise undermine their independence). 
In other words, if military courts are to survive the ECHR's scrutiny, they must resemble ordi-
nary courts in their composition and other key features. 
Regarding the ECHR's stance on military judges and courts, we might thus conclude 
that the ECHR not only de facto banned both the jurisdiction of military courts over civil-
ians91 in times of peace and the presence of military judges in criminal trials against civil-
ians, but also significantly curbed states' design choices regarding the structure of military 
courts established to try members of the armed forces. 92 All of these powers that cannot 
be exercised by military courts must thus de facto be transferred to ordinary courts-which 
is precisely what happened in Turkey. By the same token, these holdings tend undercut 
the rationale for having military courts in the first place, for they stop providing extra value 
in comparison to ordinary courts. 
By contrast, the ECHR has arrived at mixed results regarding the institutional design 
of other (that is, nonmilitary) special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The ECHR has 
adopted a less intensive review of special criminal courts that do not involve military judges 
and also, with one important exception, of other quasi-judicial bodies deciding admin-
istrative and civil-law matters. As to the former, in the recent judgment in Fruni v. Slo-
vakia, the ECHR reaffirmed the earlier case law of the ECHR and European Commission 
on Human Rights93 that the right to a fair trial in European Convention Article 6 cannot 
be read as prohibiting the establishment of special criminal courts if they have a basis in 
law,94 and acknowledged that fighting corruption and organized crime may well require 
measures, procedures, and institutions of a specialized character. 95 In Fruni, all the judges 
of the Special Court were professional career judges whose term of office was not limited 
in time, which was deemed to meet the requirements of the European Convention. 96 The 
ECHR thus conveyed the message that when a special criminal tribunal consists of ordi-
nary judges only, the Court will not interfere in domestic judicial design. As for the pres-
ence of civil servants, the ECHR found their inclusion in a judicial tribunal both com-
patible with European Convention Article 697 and "desirable and even essential" in 
91 Apart from the Turkish cases, see Maszni v. Romania, supra note 67, para. 51. 
92 This trend might reflect the general decline of military courts in Europe. For instance, the German Basic Law 
allows the establishment of federal military criminal courts "only during a state of defense or over members of the 
Armed Forces serving abroad or on board warships," BASIC LAW, Art. 96(2), at https:llwww.btg-bestellservice.de/ 
pdf/80l0 1 OOO.pdf, but no such statute has actually been enacted. France abolished military courts in times of peace 
in 1982 (laloi 82-261 du 21 juillet 1982), and Slovakia did so in 2009. The Czech Republic went even further and, 
in 1993, prohibited military courts altogether-that is, even in times of war. 
93 See, e.g., Xv. Ireland, App. No. 8299/78,1981 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 132; Erdem v. Germany, 200 I-VII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 15. 
94 Fruni v. Slovakia, App. No. 8014/07, para. 142 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 2011). 
95Id. 
96 Id., paras. 135-49. 
97 Ringeisen v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 95-97 (1971). 
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principle98-unless they are in a subordinate position to their superiors in the organiza-
tion from which they came.99 Importantly, it is not necessary to prove that such a civil 
servant was actually given orders from his or her superior. The mere appearance of sub-
ordination is enough to cast doubt on her eligibility. 100 
More recently, the ECHR expanded its interpretation of the notion of "tribunal" in 
European Convention Article 6 so as also to cover judicial councils. lol Judicial councils 
are constitutional organs sui generis, however-often with both judges and nonjudges 
(and sometimes predominantly nonjudges)-and they have never been intended tooper-
ate as courts and are not even within the state's judicial arm. They are independent, inter-
mediary organizations positioned between the judiciary and politically accountable offi-
cials in the executive or legislative branch, and are given significant powers in appointing, 
promoting, and disciplining judges. 102 Subjecting these bodies to the requirements of the 
right to a fair trial thus significantly alters their role and may have repercussions regarding 
their composition and their powers. 103 In other words, the ECHR judicialized the func-
tioning of judicial councils and effectively gave the last word in decisions regarding the 
careers of judges to judges themselves. 
These cases on quasi-judicial bodies-ones not considered by domestic systems to be part 
of the judicial power-reveal a clear pattern. Civil servants are allowed to participate in adju-
dicating fundamental rights, but only insofar as they are not in a subordinate position to their 
superiors. This view seems prima facie reasonable, but virtually any civil servant is de jure sub-
ordinate to someone within his or her ministry or agency. Consequently, this seemingly benign 
condition has significant repercussions for domestic judicial design: it strongly counsels against 
the participation of civil servants in quasi-judicial tribunals. Similarly, politicians may sit on 
judicial councils, but only insofar as they do not constitute a majority and cannot outvote judi-
cial members. 104 
In sum, this section has shown that the ECHR and IACHR both look beyond the domestic 
labels attached to institutions that function like courts. lOS They conceptualize a "judiciary" on 
broader terms than states do, and their judicial design agendas extend to wide-ranging judicial 
and quasi-judicial bodies. By expanding the standards originally applicable to the judiciary 
(narrowly construed) to quasi-judicial bodies, both courts have severely limited signatory 
states' choices regarding the institutional design of special courts, quasi-judicial bodies, and 
98 Ettl v. Austria, 117 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 40 (1987). 
99 See Belilosv. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) para. 67 (1988); Sramekv.Austria, 84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) para. 42 (1984). 
100 See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 67 (1988); Sramek v. Austria, 84 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) para. 42 (1984). 
101 See Olujic v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05, para. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 5, 2009); Volkovv. Ukraine, 2013-1 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, para. 91; see also Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, paras. 77-78 (where the ECHR read the 
requirements ofindependence and impartiality of the tribunal into the right to a private and family life). For further 
details see section "Removal and Disciplining of Judges" below. 
102 See N uno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 
57 AM. J. COMPo L. 103 (2008). 
103 See the consequences of the Volkov judgment discussed below in notes 181-89 and accompanying 
text. 
104 See TRECHSEL, supra note 10, at 48 n.14; Volkov V. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 109 (regarding the 
ECHR). 
105 See TRECHSEL, supra note 10, at 47-48. 
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judicial councils, and have put those special jurisdictions under pressure. Correspondingly, 
. this move expanded the authority of ordinary courts, whose jurisdiction broadened to cover 
areas of law, such as election law, military law, and laws governing the careers of judges, that 
were initially within the purview of different bodies. As cases on electoral and judicial councils 
attest, the gradual empowerment of ordinary courts often comes hand in hand with the judi-
cialization of politics, by which we mean "the expansion of the province of the courts or the 
judges at the expense of the politicians and/or administrators, that is, the transfer of decision-
making rights from the legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts." 106 The fol-
lowing section will show that both courts have adopted and created additional requirements 
concerning ordinary courts that further entrench a special role for judges in signatory states. 
Removal and Disciplining o/Judges 
Judicial independence is considered a cornerstone of the rule oflaw, and it is not surprising 
that both the ECHR and the IACHR vigorously protect domestic judiciaries against inappro-
priate interferences. When dealing with such cases, however, the two courts have not limited 
themselves to finding violations based on the facts of the immediate case. They have also made 
some conscious institutional choices that go beyond the individual cases-especially those 
concerning the removal and disciplining of judges. . 
The IACHR's leading case dealing explicitly with the status of judges, the Constitutional 
Court judgment, was discussed above. That specific issue in the case concerned the dismissal 
of judges, but the Court also articulated some general considerations regarding disciplinary 
proceedings against judges. The IACHR said that disciplinary proceedings were permissible 
(and even necessary in a democratic society) but that the proceedings needed to respect due 
process guarantees and could not overstep their boundaries-for example, by examining mat-
ters related to the court's exercise of its jurisdiction. More specifically, in this case the Inves-
tigation Committee put in place in order to discipline judges for specific acts went well beyond 
its mandate and investigated the whole of the judges' judicial activity. The IACHR said that this 
overstepping amounted to a denial of the judges' right to a fair trial because they disciplined 
for actions with which they were not originally charged, which precluded the preparation of 
a proper defense. l07 
The IACHR also endorsed the view that "under the rule of law, the independence of all 
judges must be guaranteed and, in particular, that of constitutional judges, owing to the nature 
of the matters submitted to their consideration." 108 The IACHR used the guarantee of judicial 
independence and the special status of Constitutional Court justices as a legitimate basis for 
Peru's Congress to consider disciplinary action and to potentially order the removal of judges. 
But the IACHR also noted that the Congress was bound by the same rules for fair trials as any 
judicial body and that it was a "tribunal" for the purpose of removing or disciplining Consti-
tutional Court justices. In other words, the only way to discipline judges is by using judicial 
106 Torbjorn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 
(Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995); see also id. (noting that the other meaning ofjudicialization is "the 
spread of judicial decision-making methods"). 
107 Constitutional Court V. Peru, supra note 31, paras. 80 - 84. 
108 Id., para. 75. 
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procedures and standards-even when the judges have special status and power as members 
of apex courts. 
In Apitz Barbera, the IACHR dealt with issues that arose in connection with the extensive 
reforms to the Venezuelan judicial system after Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999-re-
forms that included the disciplining and dismissal of many judges. 109 The restructuring of judi-
cial power in Venezuela, according to the state, required the hiring of provisional judges, who 
did not have the same rights and guarantees as their permanent counterpartsYo Even those 
who were already judges in 1999 needed to reapply for their positions if they wished to continue 
in them. lll 
The restructuring process also resulted in the creation of the Commission on the Function-
ing and Restructuring of the Judicial Power, 112 which, among other things, had the power to 
admonish, suspend, and dismiss judges.113 Subsequent legislation built on these premises and 
continued pursuing the reform goals. In 2009, a resolution from the Supreme Court of} ustice 
(Tribunal Supremo de Justicia) determined that all judges and judicial employees would be 
subject to performance evaluations. 
The main feature of these reforms was the creation of the "provisional judge." Bet"lVeen 2002 
and 2004, around 80 percent of all judicial positions were occupied by provisional judges, who 
were freely appointed and dismissed. 114 In 2010 alone, 56 percent of the judges in Venezuela 
were replacedY5 
In Apitz Barbera, the IACHR said that the vulnerability of the judicial system in this tran-
sition is magnified if no proper processes are in place for removing judges. 116 One issue in the 
case was whether the judges who determined the dismissal of Apitz Barbera and his colleagues 
in Venezuela should have been recused and whether their nonrecusal violated the American 
Convention. 117 The IACHR's examination of V enezuelan legislation and case law revealed 
that biased judges had no effective opportunity to be recused from a disciplinary trial. This 
situation could be understood as a violation of the duty to guarantee the right to a fair trial, 
as opposed to a duty to respect that right, under Article 25 of the American Convention. 1 IS 
In other words, the IACHR suggested that the right to a fair trial with respect to judges is 
not just something the state must not interfere with, but is something that the state must 
proactively seek institutionally to provide. 
The IACHR also said that domestic courts had a duty, when hearing cases that can affect 
human rights, to give reasons for their decisions, lest they be arbitrary and in violation of the 
J09 Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Administrative Disputes") v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Rep-
arations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 (Aug. 5,2008). 
110 Chocr6n Chocr6n v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 227, para. 50 (July 1, 2011). 
Jll Jd., para. 54. 
112 Comisi6n de funcionamiento y reestructuraci6n del sistema judicial. 
113 Chocr6n Chocr6n v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 60. 
114 Jd., para. 69. 
115 Jd., para. 7l. 
116 Apitz Barbera, supra note 109, para. 43. 
117 !d., para. 62. 
118 Jd., para. 66. 
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American Convention. 119 The reasons could even be contrary to the case law of higher courts; 
. the capacity of judges to disagree with higher courts is, indeed, a means of preserving judicial 
independence. 120 The Court differentiated between judicial appeals to review and correct the 
decisions oflower court judges, and disciplinary control to evaluate the conduct of judges as 
public employees: a lower court judge's commission of error cannot be the ground for disci-
plinary sanctions. 121 Because Apitz Barbera and his colleagues had been dismissed (at least in 
part) for going against the decisions of a hierarchically superior court, and because that was the 
only ground for the disciplinary procedure that led to their dismissals, their dismissals were 
considered to violate the American Convention. 122 
The IACHR ordered the state, in partial reparation, to establish a "Code of Ethics of the Ven-
ezuelan Judge" (C6digo de etica del juez y jueza venezolano) consistent with the Court's anal-
ysis of the rights at stake in the case. 123 In other words, the IACHR mandated a specific tool 
for restructuring or even designing the internal functioning of the judiciary in Venezuela-one 
that would, among other things, directly weaken higher courts' control over the rest of the judi-
cial system. Although countries in Latin America are, at least formally, civil-law countries with 
no doctrine of precedent, most of those countries have actually adopted some form of the doc-
trine for the decisions of their highest (often constitutional) courts; the IACHR judgment in 
Apitz Barbera, however, seems to undercut the doctrine by preserving the capacity of lower 
court judges to decide cases contrary to the decisions of higher courts. This judgment thus 
interferes with the internal architecture of domestic judiciaries in that it undermines the role 
of appellate courts and changes the power allocation within the judiciary by giving more power 
to lower court judges. 
In Reveron Trujillo, 124 the Court analyzed a similar case, one in which a judge was disciplined 
for allegedly abusing her authority and for not being sufficiently diligent with a case assigned 
to her. 125 Her dismissal was eventually overturned in Venezuela, but the body that did so 
refused to reinstate her position and to compensate her for lost income. 126 The IACHR case 
therefore addressed whether the overturning of her dismissal, but without reinstatement and 
payment of back salary, was a violation of Rever6n Trujillo's right to an effective remedy.127 
The IACHR noted that one of the main purposes of the separation-of-powers doctrine is to 
guarantee the independence of judges and that independence should be guaranteed not only 
in relation to individual judges like Rever6n Trujillo but also institutionally. 128 The Court thus 
took on the authority to review institutional matters since that authority is needed in order to 
guarantee the independence of judges. The IACHR was also presented, however, with an argu-
ment that the provision guaranteeing a right of access to an independent judiciary also entails 
119 Jd., para. 78 (citing Chaparro Alvarez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170, para. 107 (Nov. 21, 2007». 
120 Jd., para. 84. 
121 Jd., para. 86. 
122 Jd., para. 9l. 
123 Jd., para. 253, operative para. 19. 
124 Rever6n Trujillo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 197 (June 30, 2009). 
125 !d., para. 50. 
126 Jd., para. 55. 
127 !d., para. 56. 
128 Jd., para. 67. 
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that judges themselves have a right to be independent and not subject to undue pressures. 129 
The Court determined that judges had no right to be independent under Article 8(1) of the 
American Convention; instead, judges had a duty to be independent, and states had a duty to 
guarantee an independent judiciary. The duty to prevent violations of the right to an indepen-
dent judiciary was understood to entail positive obligations on the state to have an appropriate 
legal framework in place, but this particular issue was not at stake in Reveron Trujillo. 130 The 
Court found that Venezuela had violated the American Convention, 131 and ordered Venezuela 
to enact legislation providing stronger protections for judges in disciplinary proceedings. 132 
The difference between the duty of states to guarantee an independent judiciary and the 
right of judges to be independent may seem minor and formalistic, but it may have important 
implications in the further development of the case law. From the perspective of the IACHR's 
competences, a finding that judges have a right to be independent would appear to be an imper-
missible extension of the American Convention, whereas finding that states have a duty to 
guarantee an independent judiciary is more in line with that convention. But also, from the 
perspective of institutional design, a duty upon states to guarantee an independent judicial 
branch, as opposed to the right of individual judges to be independent, enables the IACHR to 
be more directly involved in the design of the judicial system as a whole rather than simply pro-
viding remedies to individual judges. In this instance the more conservative approach to inter-
preting the American Convention enabled the Court to directly intervene regarding institu-
tional design. 
The IACHR extended this line of thinking in the Constitutional Tribunal case against Ecua-
dor. The Court determined that the need to guarantee judicial independence has institutional 
dimensions because such independence affects the separation of powers and the important role 
that the judiciary plays in a democracy.133 Building upon its finding in Reveron Trujillo, the 
IACHR found that the right of judges to be independent arises jointly from the right to an inde-
pendent judiciary (Article 8(1) of the American Convention) and the right of access to public 
service (Article 23(l)(c) of the American Convention).134 
In Chocron Chocron v. Venezuela, 135 the latest in a series of cases against Venezuela regarding 
the dismissal of judges, 136 the IACHR further addressed questions concerning the disciplining 
of judges. Mercedes Chocr6n Chocr6n was sworn in as a temporary judge in November 
2002.137 Three months later she was told that there were objections to her appointment and 
that she would be removed. The objections were neither published nor disclosed to Chocr6n 
Chocr6n, 138 and when the IACHR asked Venezuela to provide documentation concerning the 
129 Id, para. 143. 
130 Id, paras. 146-48. 
131 Id, para. 127. 
132 Id., operative para. 10. 
133 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 268, para. 198 (Aug. 28, 20l3). 
134 Id, para. 199. 
135 Chocron Chocron v. Venezuela, supra note 110. 
136 Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Administrative Disputes") v. Venezuela, supra note 109; Reveron Trujillo v. 
Venezuela, supra note 124. 
137 Id, para. 79. 
138 Id, para. 82. 
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objections, none could be produced. 139 A central issue in the case was whether the removal of 
Chocr6n Chocr6n violated the American Convention. 140 
The IACHR noted that judges, unlike other public servants, are entitled to a series of special 
guarantees" essential for the exercise of the judicial function" -in particular, judicial indepen-
dence. 141 Such protection is needed in order to maintain the separation of powers and to pre-
vent judicial power and judges from being unduly influenced by external forces or even by 
appeal judges. 142 The Court went on to say that, even though both temporary and full-time 
judges are expected to perform the same function (administer justice) and are subject to the 
same requirements, they are not entitled to the same protections. 143 Nevertheless, even tem-
porary judges needed to be guaranteed some stability in their positions in order to protect them 
(and the judicial branch as a whole) against external pressures. 144 While the Court highlighted 
that the judicial restructuring program in Venezuela pursued a legitimate long-term goal, it also 
said that in practice, and "despite the time that ha[d] passed, the restructuring process was 
ongoing"; that is, the program had yet to achieve its g~al. 145 The Court therefore declared vio-
lations of the American Convention's provisions on judicial remedies (Articles 8(1) and 
25(1»146 and ordered Venezuela to change its legislation concerning the removability of 
judges. 147 
In discussing the implications of its judgment in Chocron Chocron, the IACHR noted that 
domestic organs in Venezuela should interpret them via the mechanism of "co'rltrol of con-
ventionality" (control de convencionalidad):148 in order to be fully compliant with their obli-
gations under the American Convention, domestic judiciaries (and other state organs) are sup-
posed to take into account the IACHR's jurisprudence as to what the American Convention 
requires. The control of conventionality doctrine will be discussed in more detail below, 149 but 
the main point for our purposes is that the mechanism serves as the means by which the IACHR 
created an obligation on states to consult the American Convention (as interpreted by the 
IACHR) when reviewing or designing their judicial branches. In other words, through the use 
of this mechanism, the IACHR created for itself a central role in domestic institutional design. 
The dismissal of judges was also addressed in Constitutional Tribunal (already discussed 
above in relation to judicial independence). The IACHR said that the removal of judges is an 
attack not only on judicial independence but, more broadly, on the democratic order.150 In 
that case, judges of Ecuador's Constitutional Tribunal were subject to political trial by the 
National Congress in the wake of allegations of misconduct. The judges attended their trial and 
139 Id, para. 80. 
140 Id, para. 89. 
141 Id., para. 67; see also Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra note 31, para. 171; Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra 
note 43, para. 145; Reveron Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 67. 
142 Chocron Chocron v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 97; see also Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Adminis-
trative Disputes") v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 55; Reveron Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 67. 
143 Chocron Chocron v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 104. 
144 Id, paras. 105-06. 
145 Id, para. 108. 
146 !d., para. 142. 
147 Id, paras. 162,205(8). 
148 Id, para. 172. 
149 See section "Judicial Lawmaking" below. 
150 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133, para. 207. 
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were absolved by a majority of the Congress. Following that decision, however, an extraordi-
nary session of the National Congress was called; the judges were not present, and they were 
dismissed from their positions. 151 Strong evidence suggests that the judges were dismissed to 
obstruct criminal proceedings against ex-president Bucaram, who was being brought to trial 
on corruption charges. 152 Although Ecuador's new constitution, adopted prior to the case 
being submitted to the IACHR, prohibits the political trial of judges, the IACHR reiterated the 
need to guarantee judicial independence and to restrict the involvement of the political 
branches with the judiciary-even with regard to constitutional court judges, who, as high-
lighted in Constitutional Court, have special status. If political branches, in hearing cases against 
judges, are not capable of acting within the parameters of what the IACHR considers to be a 
judicial body, they violate provisions of the American Convention. 
In these cases the IACHR explicitly noted that institutional norms reflecting a particular 
model of separation of powers were subordinate to substantive human rights norms-which 
can be read as implying that human rights law overrides other legal considerations. This view 
has the effect of creating a legal hierarchy, with human rights norms at the top. And since the 
mandate of human rights courtS such as the IACHR is to apply human rights treaties, it should 
be expected that human rights courts would construct such hierarchies. All legal problems are 
thus interpreted from a human rights perspective that privileges putting those norms front and 
center, 153 but one still needs to ask how this partial perspective comes to be integrated into the 
more general framework of international law. 
The case of Karen Atala Riffo and her children is relevant for our present purposes. 154 Even 
though the crux of Atala RiffO revolves around the rights of a lesbian in a stable partnership to 
retain custody of her children from a previous (heterosexual) union, part of it is also about dis-
ciplinary proceedings against judges-since Atala Riffo is a judge in Chile. Disciplinary pro-
ceedings were initiated within the judiciary to determine whether Atala Riffo' s conduct during 
the judicial proceedings for custody of her children affected her performance as a judge. Earlier, 
during those custody proceedings, it was made public that she was a lesbian in a same-sex rela-
tionship, and the disciplinary proceeding was called to assess whether her conduct "damage[d] 
the image ... of the] udiciary."155 Those proceedings (which included an inspection of her 
work environment) were conducted under the provisions of] udiciary Bylaw (C6digo organico 
de tribunales) regarding judges' moral conduct and "vices." 156 The inspector specifically men-
tioned her sexual identity as an object of concern. The sanctioning body (a court of appeals) 
that used that report as a basis for disciplining Atala Riffo did not expressly mention that part 
of the report as a basis for the sanctions but did not expressly reject it either. 157 What was 
inferred, instead, was that questioning her about her sexual identity was necessary to protect 
the "judiciary's image." The IACHR said that under no circumstances could someone's sexual 
151 Id., paras. 67-98. 
152 Id., para. 211. 
153 See also Lixinski, supra note 2. 
154 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36. 
155 Id., para. 214. 
156 !d., para. 219. 
157 Id., para. 220. 
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orientation be the basis for disciplinary proceedings and that the Chilean authorities had vio-
.lated the American Convention's nondiscrimination provision. 158 
This case was the first in the inter-American system in which a right other than the rights 
to a remedy or to a fair trial was used to assess and discuss judicial structure and design. Even 
though the rights to a remedy and to a fair trial were part of the Court's judgment, the rights 
to nondiscrimination and to a private life also affected the Court's discussion of judicial dis-
cipline and consequently its views on judicial design. More specifically, by thinking of judicial 
design beyond the confines of a fair trial and access to remedies, the IACHR has given itself the 
freedom to think about institutional design more broadly: such design needs to be assessed not 
only in terms of remedies and procedural fairness, but against the full gamut of human rights. 
It remains to be seen how this broader, less determinate agenda plays out in the future. 
The ECHR has also occasionally touched upon the domestic issues of institutional design 
in relation to disciplining judges. Although the ECHR's first cases reviewing the decisions of 
disciplinary panels against judges-Pitkevich v. Russia/ 59 plus Turkish160 and Italian 
cases
l61
-were not about institutional design per se, they are important for another reason. 
They show that in proceedings before the ECHR, disciplined judges may invoke not only their 
right to a fair trial but also other rights guaranteed by the European Convention. 162 
The reliance of domestic judges on other than fair trial rights was understandable. It is only 
recently, beginning with the 2009 case of Olujic v. Croatia, 163 that the ECHR has considered 
disciplinary proceedings as triggering the civil rights protections-the "civil limb" -ofEuro-
pean Convention Article 6. In that case the applicant was a judge and also the president of the 
Supreme Court. In 1996, the Croatian National] udicial Council (CN] C) instituted disciplin-
ary proceedings against him for, among other things, allegedly using his position to protect the 
financial activities of two individuals known for their criminal activities. During the disciplin-
ary proceedings the applicant stated that the "proceedings against him had been politically 
motivated because of his opposition to the State's senior officials with regard to the concept of 
the judiciary." 164 The CN]C accepted the allegations, however, and the applicant was dis-
missed from the Supreme Court in 1998. 
Before the ECHR Olujic alleged several violations of the right to a fair trial. In a landmark 
judgment the ECHRheld that the facts of the case triggered the civil rights protections ofEuro-
pean Convention Article 6,165 and then found four substantive violations of the right to a fair 
158 Id., paras. 221-22. 
159 Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), supra note 35. 
160 See, e.g, Albayrak v. Turkey, App. No. 38406/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2008). 
161 See N. F. v. Italy, 200 I-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, paras. 26-34; Maestri v. Italy, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 183, para. 
43 (Grand Chamber). 
~ 162 In the Pitkevich case, the applicant was dismissed for proselytizing on the bench. Before the ECHR she 
rnvoked freedom. o~ religior: (European Convention, supra note 16, Article 9), freedom of expression (Article 10), 
freedom. of aSSOCIation (ArtI~le 11), and ~rohibition?~ discrimination (Article 14). In N F. v. Italy the applicant 
,,:,as repn;nanded?y the National Co.ur:cII of the JUdICIary for being a Freemason; the ECHR found that the rep-
nmand vlOlat~d hrs freedom of ~SOCIatIO~ (Article 11). In the Albayrak case, the applicant was relocated to rural 
a~eas and repnmanded for followrng Kurdistan Workers' Party-related media-actions found to be in violation of 
hIS freedom of expression (Article 10). 
163 See Olujic v. Croatia, supra note 101, para. 16. 
164 Id., para. 16. 
165 Id., para. 44. 
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trial. 166 Two major judicial-design requirements emerge from this case. First, the ECHR sub-
jected a sui generis constitutional organ, the CN]C, to the requirements of European Con-
vention Article 6. This novel application of Article 6 has far-reaching implications for all judi-
cial councils in Europe because it affects their composition and their powers. 167 Second, in 
order to conclusion that the civil rights protections of Article 6 were applicable, the ECHR had 
to reason not only that an individual constitutional complaint against the decision of the CN] C 
was available but also that the Croatian Constitutional Court's review of the CN] e' s disci plin-
ary proceeding could be taken as indicating that "the applicant [had] access to a court under 
the domestic system."168 Moreover, by interpreting the Croatian Constitutional Court's role 
as a full judicial review of the CN]e's actions, the ECHR implicitly subordinated the CN]C 
to the Constitutional Court. 169 This move changed the balance of power between these two 
constitutional organs and gave to judges the final say in judicial politics. 
In a subsequent case raising similar issues, Ozpznar v. Turkey, 170 the ECHR avoided the Arti-
cle 6 issues but reached a similar conclusion. The applicant became a judge in 1997. A disci-
plinary investigation was initiated five years later because of her chronic lateness for work, her 
unsuitable clothing, and her close relationship with a lawyer whose clients had allegedly ben-
efited from her favorable decisions. The Turkish High Council of] udges and Public Prose-
cutors removed Ozplllar from office, mainly on the ground that "by her inappropriate attitudes 
and relationships," she had "undermined the dignity and honour of the profession."17l 
Ozplllar subsequently lodged an application with the ECHR, alleging that her dismissal by the 
judicial council had been based on aspects of her private life and that no effective remedy had 
been available to her. 
The novel aspect of this case was that Ozplllar was dismissed not by a standard court, con-
sidered a part of the judicial power under the domestic constitution, but by a judicial council 
comprising both judges and nonjudges. At that particular time the Turkish High Council of 
] udges and Public Prosecutors comprised seven members: 172 the minister of justice (who acted 
as the council's president), the undersecretary of the Ministry of}ustice, three members of the 
Court of Cassation and two members of the Council of State. 173 
As mentioned above, the ECHR did not address the Article 6 issues. 174 But the Court 
invoked European Convention Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) as a means 
1,,6 Jd., paras. 68, 76, 85, 91. 
167 See the consequences of the Volkov judgment discussed below in notes 181-89 and accompanying text. 
168 Olujic Y. Croatia, supra note 101, paras. 35-37. 
169 SeeVolkovv. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 124-29 (where the ECHRfound thatordinarycourtshadinsuf-
ficient scope to review judicial council decisions). 
170 Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36. 
171 See id., paras. 5-22. 
172 Note that the composition of the Turkish High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Hakimler ve 
savCllar yiiksek kurulu) changed as a result of the 2010 constitutional amendment. The 22-member council now 
includes the minister of justice, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, three members of the Court of Cas-
sation, two members of the Council of State, one member from the Judicial Academy, ten members from the civil 
and administrative courts of first instance, and four members appointed by the president of the Turkish Republic 
from among experienced lavvyers and lecturers. 
173 Note that the council's judicial members were nominated by the Plenary Sessions of the Court of Cassation 
and the Council of State to the president of the republic, who formally appointed them. 
174 Jd., para. 30. Relying on Apay v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 3964/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 11, 2007), it arrived 
at the conclusion that the criteria for triggering the" civil law" limb in Article 6 of the European Convention, supra 
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of addressing the dismissal ofOzplllar on the merits. It did so on the grounds of her Article 8 
. complaint. The ECHR observed that the dismissal decision had been directly related to 
Ozplllar's conduct, both private and professional, and tl},at her reputation was at stake175_ 
which interfered with her right to respect for her private life. The ECHR then distinguished 
between her on-the-bench and off-the-bench behavior and concluded that the criticisms of the 
applicant's on-the-bench behavior did not interfere with her private life. 176 But the Court 
found that the investigation had not substantiated those accusations, that it had taken into var-
ious actions of Ozplllar that were unrelated to her professional activity, 177 and that she had 
been denied adversarial proceedings before an independent and impartial supervisory body. 178 
The ECHR found a violation of Article 8 because the interference with the applicant's private 
life had not been proportionate. 
Ozpznar is important for two reasons. First, the ECHR reaffirmed its earlier approach 
that it will scrutinize domestic judicial-design issues under other substantive rights even 
though, under recent ECHR case law, disciplinary proceedings against judges fall within 
the civil rights protections of European Convention Article 6. Second, Ozpznar implicitly 
suggests that a judicial council in which the minister of justice and his undersecretary sit 
is not an appropriate body for disciplining judges as it is not an independent and impartial 
supervisory body. 
The ECHR went even further in Volkov v. Ukraine, 179 which concerned the dismissal of a 
Supreme Court judge. The first stage of the disciplinary proceedings took place before the 
Ukrainian High Council of] ustice (UH CJ). 180 The ECHR identified four structural deficien-
cies at that stage: (1) judges were in the minority on the UHC]; (2) judges on the UHC] were 
not elected by their peers; (3) only four out of the UH CJ' s twenty members worked there full 
time; and (4) the prosecutor general was a UHC] member. 
On the first issue, the ECHR stated that, for the tribunal to be considered impartial, at least 
half of its members, including the chairman, should be judges. 181 The ECHR relied heavily on 
the European Charter on the Statute for] udges, 182 which requires the substantial participation 
of judges in the relevant disciplinary body. 183 Since only three out of sixteen members of the 
UH C] who attended the hearing in the applicant's case were judges, this criterion had not been 
met. 
note 16, were not met; the Turkish Constitution explicitly prohibits judicial review of decisions of the Turkish High 
Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. 
175 Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, para. 47. 
176 Jd., para. 71. 
177 !d., para. 74; see also K.A. v. Belgium, App. Nos. 42758/98, 45558/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 17,2005). 
178 Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, paras. 77-78. 
179 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101. 
180 Due to the limited space, we cannot deal with the remaining two stages in the same detail. Regarding the par-
liamentary stage of the disciplinary proceedings with Volkov, see id., paras. 118 -22, and infta note 208 and accom-
panying text. Regarding the High Administrative Court stage of the disciplinary proceedings with Volkov, see id., 
paras. 123-30, and supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
181 id, para. 109. 
182 Council of Europe doc. DAJ/DOC (98) 23 (1998), at https:llwww.coe.intlt/dghllmonitoring/greco/ 
evaluations/round4/European-Charter-on-Statute-of-Judges_EN.pdf. 
183 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 78, 109. 
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In a second, closely related design issue, 184 the ECHR held, relying on the Venice Com-
mission, that it is not enough to have at least half of the UHCJ membership appointed 
from the judiciary; these judicial members of the UHCJ must also be elected by their 
peers. 185 Since only three of the twenty members had been so elected, Ukraine failed to 
meet this criterion. 
Third, only four UHCJ members worked there full time; the other members continued to 
work and receive a salary outside the UH CJ. According to the ECHR, this situation inevitably 
"involves their material, hierarchical and administrative dependence on their primary employ-
ers and endangers both their independence and impartiality."186 The ECHR also suggested 
that the minister of justice and the prosecutor general, who were ex officio members of the 
UH CJ, should not sit on the UH CJ at all since the loss of their primary position would entail 
resignation from the UHCJ.187 
Finally, the ECHR again referred to the Venice Commission and suggested that the inclu-
sion of the prosecutor general and other prosecutors as UHCJmembers raised further con-
cerns, as it could have a deterrent effect on judges and be perceived as a potential threat. 188 Due 
to these structural deficiencies in the proceedings before the UHCJ, the ECHR concluded that 
those proceedings violated the requirements of judicial independence and impartiality under 
European Convention Article 6(1).189 
The ECHR's case law on disciplining judges reveals several important insights. First, 
institutional changes in this area are driven by judges themselves, who often rely on their 
substantive, rather than fair trial, rights. Second, by requiring at least half of the members 
of the disciplinary panels to be judges, the ECHR de facto rules out impeachment and 
other special mechanisms. Instead, it suggests that judges should be judged primarily by 
judges-which remains a controversial position 190 even though the IACHRhas also staked 
out the same position in the cases analyzed above. Finally, the cases on high councils of 
the judiciary show that the ECHR constrains the choices of signatory states on how to 
design their judicial councils and also, implicitly, on which model of court administration 
they can adopt. More specifically, the ECHR orders judicial councils to be restructured 
so that judges are in the majority-which prioritizes judges at the expense of the politicians 
184 !d., para. Ill. 
185 !d., paras. 79, 112. 
186 !d., para. 113. 
187 Id. 
188 Id., paras. 79, 114. 
189 Id., para. 117. 
190 This position is particularly contentious in transition-to-democracy scenarios. See, e.g., DAVID 
DYZENHAUS,JUDGINGTHEJUDGES,JUDGINGOURSELVES:TRUTH,RECONCILIATIONANDTHEApART-
HEID LEGAL ORDER (2003) (on how South African judges from the apartheid era refused to appear before 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and fought back against any attempt to hold them to account); 
HAKEEM YUSUF, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010) 
(on how Nigerian judges managed to escape accountability after the fall of the militaty regime); LISA HILBINK, 
JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007) (discuss-
ing the limited accountability of the P inochet -era judges); }Jexandra H uneeus , Judging from a Guilty Con-
science: The Chilean Judiciary's Human Rights Turn, 35 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 99 (2010) (same); see also 
David Kos~~, The L,:astAccou~table Branch, 11 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 234 (2013) (recent scholarship on judicial 
accountabIlIty puts mto questIOn whether judges should be judged by judges even in established democracies). 
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and other nonjudicial members of judicial councils. This restructuring effort is most vis-
ible in Volkov, where the ECHR read the nonbinding soft law on judicial councils, created 
mainly by judges themselves, 191 into the European Convention. The Court thus indirectly 
pushed for a particular model of court administration-namely, the strong judicial coun-
cil model based on the Italian Consiglio superiore de la magistratura, which the European 
Union and Council of Europe enthusiastically endorse during the accession process for 
new EU member states. 192 The ECHR did so despite the growing criticism, both norma-
tive and empirical, of judicial self-government. 193 
Regarding the removability of judges, the ECHR initially adopted a deferential stance, but 
only toward judges of special adjudicatory bodies. For instance, in the .campbell and Fell judg-
ment, the ECHR, discussing the removability of members of the Boards of Visitors, noted that 
the relevant domestic legislation contained "neither any regulation governing the removal of 
members of a Board nor any guarantee for their irremovabiliry" and that" [i]t is true that the 
irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office must in general be con-
sidered as a corollary of their independence."194 The Court eventually concluded, however, 
that "the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability in the law does not in itselfimply 
lack of independence provided that it is recognised in fact and that the other necessary guar-
antees are present."195 Similarly, in Sramek v. Austria, the ECHR accepted at face value that 
members of the Regional Real Property Transactions Authority could be removed only under 
narrow, statutorily defined circumstances; it found no violation of the European Convention 
in that respect. 196 This initial deference is misleading, however, since these cases touched upon 
judges of highly peculiar bodies and not judges of the ordinary courts. 
The ECHR subsequently tightened its grip on the removability issues, even for judges at 
other than ordinary courts. For instance, in Bryan v. United Kingdom the ECHR faced an issue 
similar to the one addressed in Campbell and Fell. According to UK law, the secretary of state 
could issue a direction-at any time, even during ongoing proceedings-to revoke the power 
of the planning inspector to decide an appeal. Despite the similarity of these two cases, the 
ECHR stated that 
the very existence of this power available to the Executive, whose own policies may be 
in issue, is enough to deprive the inspector of the requisite appearance of indepen-
dence, notwithstanding the limited exercise of the power in practice as described by the 
191 See Michal Bobek & David Kosar, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in 
Central and Eastern Europe 15 GERMAN L.J. 1257 (2014) (further details regarding this soft law). 
192 See Cristina Parau, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 619,655 
(Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012); Bobek & Kosar, supra note 191, at 1258-62. 
193 This criticism spans virtually all the continents. See, e.g., Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 102; Parau, supra 
note 192; Anja Seibert-Fohr, European Perspective on the Rule 0/ Law and Independent Courts, 20 J. FOR 
RECr:TSPOLITII<: 161 (2012); Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin 
America (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Rule of Law Series, Working 
Paper No. 28, 2002); Brent T. White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure o/Judicial Reform in Mon-
golia, 4 E. ASIAL. REv. 209 (2009); DAVID KOSAR, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL 
SOCIETIES (2016). 
194 Campbell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 80 (1984). 
195Id 
196 Sramek v. Austria, supra note 99, para. 38. However, the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) of the Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 16, for another reason. See id., para. 42. 
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Government and irrespective o/whether its exercise was or could have been in issue in 
the present case. 197 
Similarly, in Ninn-Hansen v. Denmark the fact that "during [the term of the lay judges] it was 
not possible for any authority, including Parliament, to change the composition [of the Court 
ofImpeachment] or in any other way influence the lay judges" 198 seems to have saved the Dan-
ish government. 199 
Two subsequent judgments, Brudnicka v. Poland and Luka v. Romania, confirm this trend. 
The applicants in the 2005 Brudnicka case200 complained that the maritime chambers that had 
heard their cases had not been independent and impartial tribunals. The ECHR agreed with 
them: "Given that the members of the maritime chambers (the president and vice-president) 
are appointed and removed from office by the Minister of] ustice in agreement with the Min-
ister of Transport and Maritime Mfairs, they cannot be regarded as irremovable, and they are 
in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the Ministers. "201 The ECHR thus held that maritime cham-
bers cannot be considered impartial and independent tribunals. 
More recently, in 2009, the ECHR addressed the irremovability of judges in Luka v. Roma-
nia.202 Luka complained that the courts hearing his case had been neither impartial nor inde-
pendent because they had included lay judges (so-called judicial assistants) who had been vul-
nerable to outside pressure. The ECHR agreed. Although the Court noted the advantage of 
courts that include a mixture of professional and lay judges, 203 it found that domestic law had 
not afforded sufficient guarantees as to their independence in performing their duties. 204 Most 
importantly, the ECHR stressed that the judicial assistants had not been irremovable and, 
moreover, that the applicable legislation did not list criteria for their removal. 205 Judicial assis-
tants were therefore not protected against the premature termination of their duties, with the 
consequence that the panels that included such assistants were not independent. 
A year later, in Urban v. Poland, the ECHR reaffirmed its strict position and held that a Pol-
ish trial court that included a so-called assessor-a candidate for the office of district court 
judge who could be removed by the minister of justice-lacked independence, even though 
the minister had the power to do so only with the approval ofa regional court's board of judges 
(a power that the government's statistics showed had never been exercised).206 In addition, the 
ECHR suggested that the dismissal of probationary judges must be susceptible to judicial 
197 Bryan v. United Kingdom, 335-AEur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 38 (1995) (emphasis added). The Court even~ 
tually heid, however, that Article 6(1) of the European Convention, supra note 16, was not violated; the scope of 
review of the High Court was sufficient to comply with that article. But if. British-American Tobacco Co. v. Neth-
erlands, 331 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 77 (1995). 
198 Ninn-Hansen v. Denmark (dec.) , 1999-VEur. Ct. H.R. 321; see also Gublerv. France, App. No. 69742/01, 
para. 28 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 27,2006). 
199 See also Yavuz v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 29870/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 25,2000). 
200 Brudnicka v. Poland, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 153. 
201 Id., para. 41. 
202 Luka v. Romania, App. No. 34197/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 21,2009). 
203 Id., para. 42. 
204 Id., para. 47. 
205 Id., para. 44. 
206 Urban v. Poland, App. No. 23614/08, paras. 49-50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 2010). 
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review.207 Finally, in the 2013 Volkov v. Ukraine case, the ECHR scrutinized the quasi-
impeachment ofVolkovvia a plenary meeting of Parliament and concluded that that meet-
ing was not an appropriate forum for examining issues of fact and law, assessing evidence, 
and "making a legal characterisation of the facts"; politicians sitting in Parliament were not 
required to have any of the legal or judicial experience needed to determine complex issues 
of fact and law in an individual disciplinary case.208 The key insight of the Urban and 
Volkov cases is thus that the closer the resemblance between an ordinary court and the 
forum of a dismissed judge, the more stringent the applicable criteria become. The def-
erential approach of Campbell and Fell and Sramek is reserved only for decision makers of 
peculiar adjudicatory bodies, if at all. 
In sum, these cases show that, in the exercise of their functions, judges are at once holders 
and stewards of the rights protected by the European and American Conventions. The fact that 
the ECHR and IACHR find themselves in a position to make determinations about the rights 
of judges means that the two courts endow themselves with the mandate to inquire into inter-
nal structures of the judiciary. In particular, the courtS have determined that the processes for 
regulating judges must satisfy the same standards as the judiciary itselfin administering justice 
to others. The broader implication is that the ECHR and IACHR see themselves as having a 
mandate to review the functioning of professional bodies in general-at least to the extent such 
bodies can sanction their members. And particularly in the Dzpinar and Atala Riffo cases, the 
ECHR and IACHR, respectively, also found that requirements in addition to those for a fair 
trial and access to remedies-for instance, the right to private and family life-are applicable 
in efforts to regulate judges and in reviewing the composition of the judiciary. According to 
the ECHR and IACHR, judges are civil servants, but they also have lives beyond their public 
calling. Signatory states do not enjoy unfettered discretion in determining how judges should 
behave outside the bench. 
But it is not only by deciding on the validity of specialized jurisdictions or regulating the role 
of the domestic judge that international human rights courts have a say in how to structure a 
domestic judiciary. As we shall see in the next section, international human rights courts also 
attempt to define what each country should understand as "law" -the very subject matter of 
judicial activity. 
Judicial Lawmaking 
The previous two sections showed how both the ECHR and IACHR, whether intentionally 
or not, have pushed for institutional changes regarding military tribunals and the disciplining 
of judges that have, in turn, gradually empowered the judiciary in its ordinary role and shifted 
the balance of power between the three branches of government. This section shows a subtler 
and less visible way in which the two courts have expanded the role of judges. In particular, the 
courts have interpreted "law," a term that appears in most limitation clauses of the European209 
207 Id., para. 53. 
208 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 122. 
209 European Convention, supra note 16, Arts. 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly 
and association), 12 (right to marry); id., Protocol, Art. 1 (protection of property); id., Protocol No. 4, Art. 2 (free-
dom of movement and residence). 
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and American210 Conventions, so as to cover not only statutes and regulatory measures, but 
also judicial decisions. 211 
In Europe, this trend was gradual. It began in 1979 with the ECHR's decision in the seminal 
free speech case, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom. 212 When dealing with the law of contempt 
of court, which was largely "a creature of the common law and not oflegislation,"213 the Court 
observed that "the word 'law' in the expression 'prescribed by law' covers not only statute bur 
also unwritten law."214 The Court added: 
It would clearly be contrary to the intention of the drafters of the Convention to hold that 
a restriction imposed by virtue of the common law is not "prescribed by law" on the sole 
ground that it is not enunciated in legislation: this would deprive a common-law State 
which is Party to the Convention of the protection of Article 1 0 (2) (art. 10-2) and strike 
at the very roots of that State's legal system.215 
This pronouncement was not controversial. The case concerned a common-law jurisdiction, 
and nothing in the Court's careful wording implied that the same principle would apply to 
continental legal systems.216 Subsequently, however, in Kruslin v. France,217 the Court explic-
itly rejected the argument of France and the Delegate of the Commission218 that judge-made 
law counts as a separate source of law only in common-law countries. 
The Sunday Times, Dudgeon and Chappell judgments admittedly concerned the United 
Kingdom, bur it would be wrong to exaggerate the distinction between common-law countries 
and Continental countries . ... Statute law is, of course, also of importance in common-
law countries. Conversely, case-law has traditionally played a major role in Continental coun-
tries, to such an extent that whole branches of positive law are largely the outcome of decisions 
by the courts . ... Were it to overlook case-law, the Court would undermine the legal sys-
tem of the Continental States almost as much as the Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 
1979 would have "struck at the very roots" of the United Kingdom's legal system ifit had 
excluded the common law from the concept of "law" .219 
210 American Convention, supra note 13, Arts. 12 (freedom of conscience and religion), 13 (freedom of thought 
and expression), 15 (right of assembly), 16 (freedom of association), 17 (rights of the family), 21 (right to property), 
22 (freedom of movement and residence), 23 (right to participate in government). The American Convention also 
has a general clause on restrictions (Article 30), which is used, for instance, to make restrictions possible to the right 
to private life (Article 11). See Lucas Lixinski, Comparative International Human Rights Law: An Anarysis o/the Right 
to Private andFamiry LifiAcross Human Rights 'Jurisdictions, "32 NORDIC]. HUM. RTS. 99, 102 (20 14) (discussion 
of Article 11). 
211 Note that the concept oflaw plays a critical role also in those articles that do not have an explicit limitation 
clause. See, for example, Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention, supra note 16, which requires 
that tribunals be established by"'law," and Article 7 (punishment without law), in which "law" determines the foun-
dation for criminal proceedings. 
212 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1),30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
213 Id, para. 47. 
214 Id 
215 Id 
216 See also the follow-up cases against the United Kingdom: Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) para. 44 (1981), and Chapell v. United Kingdom, 152-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 53 (1989). 
217 Kruslin v. France, 176-A Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1990). 
218 Id, para. 28 (for the position France and the delegate of the European Commission of Human Rights). 
219 Id, para. 29 (emphasis added). 
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This conclusion has been confirmed by several Grand Chamber judgments220 and is now 
. part of the ECHR's settled case law. The concept oflaw in the European Convention must be 
understood to include not only statutory law but judge-made law in both common-law and 
civil-law jurisdictions.221 
The impact of Kruslin cannot be overestimated. It has serious repercussions for European 
civil-law jurisdictions. Most of them do see judicial decisions as having some normative 
effects,222 but judge-made law is not treated as a formal source oflaw and is not on a par with 
statutes. As the Delegate of the Commission argued in Kruslin, case law is a secondary source 
of French law, whereas the convention, in limitation clauses using phrases such as "in accor-
dance with law" was, it was argued, referring only to primary sources oflaw-that is, statutes, 
not case law.223 This position is, in fact, the standard one not only in F rance224 but also in other 
civil-law systems in Europe.225 
The ECHR rejected that position, however, and recognized neither the uniqueness of acts 
deriving from parliament nor their qualitative difference from other sources oflaw. This hold-
ing has the effect of upgrading judicial decisions to become primary sources of law, even in 
civil-law systems. The ECHR thus has explicitly taken the view that ordinary domestic courts 
not only interpret laws but also engage in lawmaking. The effect is to undermine the primacy 
of parliamentary legislation in continental Europe.226 Some European domestic courts have 
already exploited this ECHR doctrine by recognizing their own decisions as having the same 
normative value as new statutes approved by parliament. For instance, the Italian Court of Cas-
sation, the highest court for civil and criminal matters, declared its own case law as a new" ele-
ment oflaw" under Article 666 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 227 which was allegedly nec-
essary to meet the requirements of the ECHR's case law on European Convention Article 7 (no 
punishment without law). 
The impact of the Kruslin judgment and its progeny is not limited to their conceptual impact 
on categorizing sources oflaw and on defining the lawmaking role of judges in civil-law juris-
dictions. This case law is also consequential. The recent Grand Chamber judgment in Mooren 
220 See, e.g., Leyla ~ahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 115, para. 88 (Grand Chamber); Sanoma Uitgevers 
B.Y. v. Netherlands, App. No. 38224/03, para. 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 14,2010) (Grand Chamber). 
221 Kruslin v. France, supra note 217. 
222 See, e.g., Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
133-262 (3d ed. 1995) (regarding Germany); HUGO UYTERHOEVEN, RICHTERLICHE RECHTSFINDUNG 
UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG. EINE VORSTUDIE DBER DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG ALS HILFSMITTEL 
DER RICHTERLICHEN RECHTSFINDUNG 1M PRIVATRECHT (1959) (regarding Switzerland); PHILIPE 
MALAURIE & PATRICK MORVAN, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GENERALE 265 (2d ed. 2005) (regarding 
France). 
223 Kruslin v. France, supra note 217, para. 28. 
224 See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E LASSER,JUDlCIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 173 (2004); Jan Komarek, QuestioningJudicial Deliberations, 29 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 805, 809-10, 824 (2009) (recent debate between Lasser and Komarek); see also Olivier Beaud, 
Reframing a Debate Among Americans: Contextualizing a Moral Philosophy 0/ Law, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 53, 59 
(2009). 
225 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
226 See Nicola Lupo & Giovanni Piccirilli, European Court o/Human Rights and the Quality o/Legislation: Shifting 
to a Substantial Concept o/'Law'?, 6 LEGISPRUDENCE 229 (2012). 
227 Cass., Jan. 21, 2010, n. 18288 (Sezioni unite), at http://www.europeanrights.eu/publiclsentenze/ 
18288_05_10.pdf (in Italian); see also Lupo & Piccirilli, supra note 226,240-41. 
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v. Germany228 is a perfect example. In Mooren the applicant contested the legality of his deten-
tion, and did so on two grounds. First, he argued that the distinction made by the domestic 
courts between" defective" and "void" detention orders229 had no basis in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Second, he stressed that the Court of Appeal's refusal to reach a decision on the mer-
its itself contradicted the clear wording Article 309, section 2, of that code.230 
The ECHRrejected both arguments. Regarding the first, it noted that "the distinction made 
under German law between 'defective' and 'void' detention orders is well-established in the 
domestic courts' case-law" and thus that "the applicant, if necessary with the advice of his coun': 
sel, could have foreseen the Court of Appeal's finding on this point."231 Regarding the second 
argument, the ECHR acknowledged that the Court of Appeal's decision to remit the case to 
the court of first instance-after finding the detention order to be defective-ran counter to 
Article 309, section 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 232 The ECHR added, however, that 
"the Court of Appeal, in remitting the case to the District Court, expressly referred to previous 
decisions of other courts of appeal which concerned cases comparable to the applicant's,"233 
and that "[i]n these circumstances, the [ECHR was] satisfied that the remittal of his case to the 
court of first instance and his continuous detention at least up to that court's decision was suf-
ficiently foreseeable for the applicant."234 
In other words, the ECHR accepted that domestic courts have the power to amend the stat-
ute in criminal matters to the detriment of the defendant. It is clear that, without the shift in 
Kruslin that upgraded domestic judicial decisions to be on a par with statutes, the detention 
of Mooren would not have been "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law," as 
required by Article 5(1) of the European Convention. 
By contrast, the idea of judicial lawmaking in the IACHR is closely connected to the doctrine 
of control o/conventionality. That doctrine, developed by the IACHR in a series of cases starting 
withAlmonacidArellano,235 requires that domestic judges, in interpreting domestic law, take 
into consideration the American Convention and, importantly, the IACHR's interpretations 
of the convention. The underlying assumption is that states parties to the American Conven-
tion have made the convention, including the IACHR's interpretations of the convention, part 
of domestic law.236 
228 Mooren v. Germany, 2009 50 EHRR 554 (Grand Chamber). 
229 Note that a defective detention order remains a valid basis for detention until the defect is remedied by the 
appeal courts in the course of the judicial review proceedings, whereas a void detention order-one containing a 
serious and obvious defect-provides no lawful basis for detention. See id., para. 48. 
230 !d., para. 90. 
231 Id., para. 91. 
232 Id., para. 92. 
233 Id., para. 93. 
234 !d. 
235 Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
236 For more in-depth analysis of this notion and its evolution, see Ariel A. Dulitzky, EI impacto del control de 
convencionalidai ~ Un cambio de paradigma en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos?, in TRATADO DE LOS 
DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES 533 (Julio Cesar Rivera ed., 2014); Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnes-
ties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203 (2011); Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, The 
Conventionality Control: Examples of(Un)successful Experiences in Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. 
J. 200 (2010). 
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Under the early case law on control of conventionality, the doctrine applied specifically to 
the merits of a case: had the state complied with its obligations under American Convention 
Article 2 to incorporate the convention into domestic law? But the doctrine was then extended 
to apply to remedies. That is, separate from the question of a case's merits, the remedies ordered 
by a domestic court must take into account the American Convention and the IACHR's rel-
evant jurisprudence.237 Arld as the earlier discussion of Castaneda Gutman indicates, control 
of conventionality has been further extended to include structural issues-in that instance, the 
availability of judicial review of a previous decision in the same case. 
The IACHR sees control of conventionality as applying to the interpretation not only of stat-
utory law but also of internal legal practices broadly defined. Arld since the primary activity of 
courts is to review those internal practices (via the cases that are presented for decision), case 
law itselfis expected to comply with the American Convention. The control of conventionality 
mechanism thus becomes an important means by which the IACHR defines its own role and 
expands its influence in the hemisphere. 238 Importantly, too, even if control of conventionality 
does not explicitly give courts the power to make laws, the doctrine does seem to imply that 
domestic courts, high or low, have the power to strike down laws. The IACHR's case law on 
control of conventionality, which categorizes court decisions as law for the purpose of limi-
tation clauses, has important real-world consequences. By diffusing the power of judicial 
review-now spread over the entire judicial system-the doctrine potentially alters the rules 
of the game in countries with concentrated judicial--review powers.239 That is, endowing 
domestic courts with the power to strike down laws may change both the outcome of court 
cases and the overall dynamic of the judicial systems themselves. 
The question whether judicial decisions form part of the law for the purpose of the American 
Convention's limitation clauses has been addressed, but only tangentially, in two cases involv-
ing Barbados. In one of them, Boyce,240 the IACHR applied the control of conventionality doc-
trine to consider whether the consideration of local laws by local courts and the UK Privy 
Council (still the court oflast resort for Barbados under Commonwealth rules) had violated 
the American Convention. While the IACHR did not explicitly refer to court judgments as law 
per se, it implied that they were in determining that courts cannot be precluded from consid-
ering legal matters concerning the American Convention and that the UK Privy Council and 
the Caribbean Court of] ustice are also subject to control of conventionality standards.241 More 
recently, in Dacosta Cadogan,242 a separate opinion by] udge Garda Ramirez said that, as Bar-
bados is a common-law country, judicial decisions are part of the law of the land that needs to 
comply with the American Convention.243 
Based on the above discussion ofECHR and IACHR jurisprudence, it is clear that the two 
courts have used different mechanisms in examining the matter of judicial lawmaking. The 
237 Dulitzky, supra note 236, at 534-35. 
238 Ii at 535. 
239 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. 
240 Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
169 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
241 Ii, para. 78. 
242 Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 2014 (Sept. 24, 2009). 
243 Ii, Sep. Op. Sergio Garda Ramirez, J., para. 12. 
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differences can be partly attributed to timing: it is only recently that common-law countries 
have had cases adjudicated by the IACHR, and it is uncertain whether this reasoning will spill 
over onto cases involving civil-law jutisdictions, as it did in the ECHR. In this context the 
IACHR has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of "law" in cases decided after Boyce and 
Dacosta Cadogan. One of these later cases involved American Convention Article 9 (nullum 
crimen sine lege), which, because of the nature of criminal law statutes, the Court saw as requir-
ing a narrow interpretation.244 Likewise, in Barreto Leiva,245 which built on a 1986 advisory 
., 246 h C 1 d "1 " ~. 1 h fd opmlOn, t e . ourt narrow y construe aws as reternng on y to t e enactments 0 em-
ocratically elected representatives. Thus, at least for now, it appears that the IACHR does not 
consider domestic judicial decisions to be lawmaking for the purposes of the American Con-
vention, even if control of conventionaliry clearly puts the IACHR's own judgments on the 
same footing as law. 247 
Therefore, on the question whether domestic courts engage in lawmaking, the ECHR and 
IACHR seem to diverge. Whereas the ECHR has used case law in common-law jurisdictions 
as a stepping stone to the position that judicial decisions are law for the purposes of the Euro-
pean Convention, the IACHR has so far adopted a narrow interpretation of what law is, and 
has restricted its extension to case law only in relation to the (few and recent) cases involving 
common-law jurisdictions. But the IACHR has used the concept of control of conventionaliry 
to make case law a part of the law, which makes its position somewhat problematic. More spe-
cifically, the IACHR sees its own jurisprudence as having the force of law in American Con-
vention states but does not consider the domestic case law of states parties as relevant to the 
Court's determinations of whether countries are in compliance with the American Convention 
and the Court's dictates. This position supports the more conservative reading of the conven-
tion by civil-law jurisdictions and also the established understanding of judicial power in those 
countries. Although this position is therefore respectful of national sovereignty, it enables 
domestic judges to hide behind the IACHR when going against their governments (since judi~ 
cial decisions are not taken into account in determining compliance with the American Con-
vention), and it means that states' legislative branches need to be more mindful of the IACHR. 
That is, states have to revise legislation in light ofIACHR judgments more actively than they 
would if judicial decisions were considered law; restrictive interpretations by judges of existing 
law in accordance with IACHR judgments would be sufficient. Article 2 of the American Con-
vention creates an obligation upon legislative branches to enact legislation in accordance with 
the convention, and the Court has used that provision in several instances. But the doctrine 
of control of conventionality seemingly obligates states' legislative branches to enact legislation 
even when states' records have not come under IACHR scrutiny. 
Despite these differences, each of the two courts' approaches to judicial lawmaking has the 
consequence of expanding judicial powers. This expansion seems at odds with the established 
differences between common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, and is therefore intrusive. As we 
244 Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, paras. 63-67 (May 
2,2008). 
245 Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 206, para. 76 
(Nov. 17, 2009). 
246 The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.6 (May 9, 1986). 
247 Dulitzky, supra note 236, at 547. 
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highlighted above, however-at least with respect to civil-law jurisdictions in the Americas-
many of those countries had already adopted means to give judicial decisions (at least of higher 
courts) some precedential value. More importantly, though, by construing domestic judicial 
power as a form of lawmaking, international human rights courts (perhaps unintentionally) 
have created further means of entrenching their power and expanding their own domestic 
influence. The central dynamic here is that the decisions of domestic judiciaries are the most 
common means of enforcing the judgments of international human rights courts, in part 
because domestic judges are more likely than legislatures to consult the decisions of courts from 
other jurisdictions, including international courts. In the inter-American system, in particular, 
the doctrine of control of conventionality ensures that domestic judges consult and enforce 
international (namely, IACHR) judgments. When such a dynamic is at work, domestic judges 
are themselves lawmakers (even if only to a limited extent), and the human rights court is, in 
effect, itself a domestic lawmaker. 
The consequences of expanding judicial lawmaking powers are thus twofold. First, regional 
human rights courts empower domestic courts vis-a.-vis other domestic institutions. Domestic 
courts are more natural allies of regional human rights courts than domestic legislatures are, 
and they may help the ECHRand IACHR both to secure compliance with their judgments and 
to enhance their legitimacy.248 Domestic courts, in general, and the highest national courts, 
in particular, can help monitor the enforcement ofECHR and IACHR judgments in their own 
states and, by issuing similar decisions, even increase the support within their own states for 
those judgments. 249 This dynamic places the other branches of government in a difficult posi-
tion before regional human rights courts; it is extremely hard for a government to contest before 
the ECHR or IACHR a judgment of its own highest court.250 Hence, the second consequence 
of expanding the lawmaking powers of domestic courts is to increase the power of regional 
human rights courts. Put differently, by empowering domestic courts, the ECHR and the 
IACHR also empower themselves. 
The analysis so far has shown the influence that regional human rights courts have had in 
three specific subject areas. But do these isolated pronouncements-the courts' responses to 
the particular cases that have appeared on their dockets-amount to something akin to a clear 
agenda or roadmap for domestic judicial design? The next part discusses this possibility. 
II. JUDICIAL DESIGN AGENDAS OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
Part I identified three avenues by which the regional human rights courts both constrained 
states' choices regarding the institutional design of domestic judiciaries and advanced their 
judicial design agendas. This part discusses broader implications stemming from the case law 
of the ECHR and IACHR, and identifies similarities and differences among them. The first 
section compares the judicial design agendas of the ECHR and IACHR, and the second 
248 See Sadurski, supra note 18, at 414-20 (who describes the cooperation between the ECHR and the Polish 
Constitutional Court that led to Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 2006-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (Grand Chamber»; SHAI 
DOTHAN, REpUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
111-12 (2014) (showing other examples). 
249 DOTHAN, supra note 248, at Ill. 
250 SeeA. v. United Kingdom, 2009-IIEur. Ct. H.R. 137, para. 157 (where the ECHRobserved thatthe "present 
situation is, undoubtedly, unusual in that Governments do not normally resort to challenging, nor see any need to 
contest, decisions of their own highest courts before this Court"). 
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addresses how and to what extent these two courts define the contours of the "optimal judi-
ciary." The overarching idea in this part is that human rights courts are embedding themselves 
domestically and constructing their power not only by partneringwith domestic judiciaries251 
but also by reshaping them into more powerful players within the domestic sphere,252 as we 
suggested at the end of part 1. In other words, human rights courts empower themselves when 
they empower domestic courts. 
Comparing the European and Inter-American Courts 
Part I showed that both the ECHR and IACHR have been increasingly engaged with domestic 
judicial design, and it did so by examining thre.e different dimensions of that engagement. This 
part takes a step back and assesses the intervention of both courts more broadly: Who is taking 
the domestic judicial design cases to the ECHR and IACHR? Which articles of the European 
and American Conventions are used as main "vehicles" to advance the judicial design agendas 
of the two courts? How much do the courts intervene in the design of domestic judiciaries (that 
is, how wide is the margin of appreciation that each court leaves for states parties)? How bold 
are the remedies prescribed by the two courts? Finally, does the maturity of democracy play any 
role in the level of deference afforded by the ECHR and IACHR? The answers to these ques-
tions will enable us to understand the differences and similarities in the judicial design agendas 
of the two courts, as well as how judicial power has expanded in favor of domestic and inter-
national courts. 
The impact of domestic judges on agendas for judicial design. In both the ECHR and IACHR, 
the majority of applicants in cases pertaining to judicial design are themselves judges, and the 
cases turn on findings about the judicial function and the requirements around it.253 Other 
applicants include politicians,254 victims of massacres, 255 and people criminally prosecuted for 
terrorism. 256 In all of these cases, the applicants have been excluded from the civilian judiciary 
because their activities were beyond the scope of regular jurisdictions, because they were vic-
tims of noncivilians who sought refuge outside the reach of civilian courts, or because the 
offenses they were charged with pertained to national security. Given that domestic judges rep-
resent what is, by far, the largest group of applicants in cases that have raised questions of judi-
cial design, those judges and those cases have played a central role as the ECHR and IACHR 
have developed their agendas for domestic judicial design. The extent to which judges have 
taken their own cases to the ECHR and IACHR is, indeed, not surprising. Those courts provide 
an opportunity for judges both to secure their own positions domestically and, more generally, 
to strengthen the judicial branch of government. Another factor is that in domestic systems the 
principal lawmaker-that is, the legislature-retains the ability to change the law in response 
251 See, for instance, the work of Karen Alter, Altering Politics: International Courts and the Construction o/Inter-
national and Domestic Politics, in POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE GLOBAL AGE (Peter A. Hall, Wade 
Jac?by, J?nah Levy ~ ~op.hie .Meunier eds., 2014) (arguing that human rights courtS enhance their power by part-
nenng With domestIC lllStltutlOns). 
252 For a narrower argument along the same lines, see Helfer, supra note 17, at 146. 
253 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133; Campbell v. United Kingdom, 
supra note 194. 
254 Castaneda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13; Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68. 
255 19 Merchants v. Colombia, supra note 32. 
256 Lori Berenson Mejia v. Peru, supra note 30. 
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to an undesired court decision affecting domestic judicial design, and in some countries the 
. principal lawmaker may retain a type of constitutional override.257 With the involvement of 
international human rights courts, however, it may be much more difficult for states to alter 
the law following a court decision. 
The incentive, as discussed above, for domestic judges to bring cases to international human 
rights courts has a strong "bridging effect"258 between domestic and supranational judges. 
Through their willingness to rule in favor of individual judges and against their national gov-
ernments, the ECHRand IACHRsignal to bold judges throughout the states parties their read-
iness to review alleged violations of both procedural and substantive rights by judges' govern-
ments.259 This empowerment of domestic judges against their own governmental institutions 
increases the likelihood that these judges will be willing to exercise the muscular judicial review 
needed to remedy convention violations at home.26o By protecting domestic judges the ECHR 
and IACHR also move away from their traditional hierarchical relationship with domestic 
courts, in which the international courts review the work of domestic judges,261 and toward 
a more partner-like relationship.262 Over time, for example, the ECHR and IACHR have 
forged a compliance partnership with domestic judges.263 Through such a process, interna-
tional courts gain allies in domestic judges, who, protected by supranational courts from poten-
tial attacks by the political branches, will then work to further entrench the ideas and doctrines 
of the international courts domestically. . 
Convention provisions deemed relevant to judicial design. Myriad provisions in the European 
and American Conventions are now used to inform judicial design. The use of these provisions 
is largely the product of the increasing number of applications lodged by domestic judges, who 
often rely on substantive rights rather than on the right to a fair trial, which had long been the 
257 Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization o/International Regimes: The 
Politics o/MajoritarianActivism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World 
Trade Organization, 1 J. L. & CTS. 61, 65 (2013). 
258 The bridging/bonding distinction was introduced by Robert Putnam in BOWLING ALONE: COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2000) and Pamela Paxton in Social Capital and Democracy: An Inter-
dependent Relationship, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 254 (2002). Essentially, bonding social networks are defined as bringing 
"together people who are like one another in important respects (ethnicity, age, gender, social class, and so on)," 
whereas bridging ones "bring together people who are unlike one another." Robert D. Putnam & Kristin A. Goss, 
Introduction, in DEMOCRACIES IN FLUX: THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
1, 11 (Robert D. Putnam ed., 2002). 
259 See, mutatis mutandis, Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory 0/ Effective Suprana-
tionalAdjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 311-12 (1997). 
260 See Helfer, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that" [wlhere executive branch officials or legislators maintain sub-
stantial control over judicial appointments, retentions, or salaries, a judge's interest in professional survival sharply 
diminishes his or her incentive to hold governments accountable for human rights abuses"). 
261 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 259, at 297. 
262 See Huneeus, supra note 11, at 495 (arguing that "the compliance gap between executives and justice system 
actors suggests that the Inter-American Court-and international human rights courts more generally-could 
increase compliance by more directly engaging national judges and prosecutors, deliberately cultivating national 
justice systems as partners in compliance"); Helfer, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that" [tlhe cooperation of national 
judiciaries is essential to maintaining and improving compliance with European human rights standards"). 
263 On the importance of national courts in ensuring compliance with international human rights rulings more 
generally, see Andre Nollkaemper, The Role o/National Courts in Inducing Compliance with International andEuro-
pean Law-a Comparison, in COMPLIANCE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW 164-65 (Marise Cremona 
ed., 2012); Harold Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1401, 1413 (I 998 -99); 
J ames Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory o/International Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 
506,520-25 (2005); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 259, at 288-90,310-11, 353. 
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primary vehicle for advancing domestic judicial design. In this context the ECHR has consid-
ered freedom of expression,264 freedom of association,265 freedom of religion,266 and respect 
for private and family life,267 as well as fair trial rights.268 The lACHR has also shown some 
initial activity along these lines,269 though it still tends to rely primarily on the provisions for 
fair trial and access to remedies when discussing judicial design. Domestic judges and courts 
are strengthened as more and more actions by judges are decided in their favor, but the biggest 
winners are the international courts. The rights to a fair trial and to respect for private and fam-
ily life are particularly important provisions for the purpose of expanding the jurisdiction of 
human rights courts, and they operate as veritable blanket clauses. Other provisions may also 
have that effect, albeit to a lesser extent. What is important is that, because nothing in either 
the European or American Convention directly authorizes the ECHR or lACHR to address 
matters of judicial design, the two courts have had to be creative and to advance their agendas, 
generally as obiter dicta, under the umbrella of rights explicitly protected by the conventions. 
Implementation of judgments concerningjudicial design. Both the ECHR and lACHR leave 
little room for domestic authorities to maneuver in implementing their judgments concerning 
judicial design. For instance, in Morris the ECHR rejected the United Kingdom's minimalist 
compliance with the Findlay ruling, and even after the country had revamped its courts-mar-
tial, the ECHR, in Grieves, found the United Kingdom noncompliant again. In Volkov the 
Court went even further and, apart from payments for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage, 
ordered Ukraine to take a number of general measures aimed at reforming the system of judicial 
discipline, including "legislative reform involving the restructuring of the institutional basis of 
the system"270 and, for the first time in its history, the reinstatement of the.applicant as judge 
of Ukraine's Supreme Court at the earliest possible date.271 The relevance oflocal expertise272 
and local specifics273 in implementation are consequently reduced, and the ECHR may some-
d h d· . I' d' 274 B times be perceived as remote an uncompre en mg m re anon to omestlc concerns. y 
contrast, the lACHR has consistently taken a stronger position and reinforced its own doctrine 
264 Wille v. Liechtenstein, supra note 34; Kudeshkina v. Russia, supra note 34; Albayrak v. Turkey, supra note 
160. 
265 N. F. v. Italy, supra note 161. 
266 Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), supra note 35. 
267 Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36. See also Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36, for the IACHR. 
268 See, for example, Olujic v. Croatia, supra note 101, and virtually all of the other ECHR decisions discussed 
in part 1. 
269 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36. 
270 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 10 1, para. 200. 
271 Id., para. 208. 
272 Jannika Jahn, Ruling (In)directly Through Individual Measures?-Effect and Legitimacy of the ECHR's New 
Remedial Power, 74 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 1,26 (2014). . 
273 The inattention to local specifics may cause serious problems to the domestic authorities. For instance, the 
head of Ukraine' s High Council ofJustice, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, st~ted in an interview on Octo?er 8, 2013, that 
according to Ukrainian legislation, Volkov could only be newly appomted to t~e post but not remstated; th~ law 
on the "Judiciary and Status of Judges" limited the number of judges to forty-eight. See European Human Rights 
Advocacy Centre, Oleksandr Volkov Reinstated as Supreme Court Judge in Ukrai~e (Feb. 2, 2015), at http://~. 
ehrac.org.uklnews/oleksandr-volkov-reinstated-a~-sup.reme-court-judge-in-ukra.me/; see also Volkov v. Ukrame, 
supra note 101 (Yudkivska, J., concurring). Despite thiS problem, Volkov was remstated to the Supreme Court of 
Ukraine in February 2015. 
274 See John Bell, Interpretative Resistance Faced with the Case-Law of the Strasbourg Court, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 134, 
142 (2008). 
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of control of conventionality (even citing examples across the continent of its recognition by 
. domestic high courts) as the key to compliance. It has repeatedly noted that states and their 
judiciaries need to take into account lACHR jurisprudence when designing any judicial 
reforms.275 
Both the ECHR and lACHR stipulate not merely the result to be achieved but also the 
desired model-that is, how to get there. Consider the following examples from the case law 
of the ECHR and lACHR: both courts curbed the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians 
and also military personnel, thereby effectively requiring trials before ordinary courts;276 both 
courts de facto prohibit the impeachment ofjudges;277 and the ECHR prefers judges to be dis-
ciplined by ordinary courts instead of by judiciary councils, which comprise both judges and 
nonjudges.278 These differences matter because an obligation of means is a lot more intrusive 
upon domestic sovereignty than a mere obligation of result. 279 The latter leaves it up to states 
to choose how to meet the standards set by the regional human rights courts, thus allowing 
a plurality of institutional solutions, whereas the former directs states to adopt a particular 
institutional model and prohibits the alternatives. A reasonable interpretation is that in 
cases involving domestic judicial design, the ECHR and IACHR are ordering the combi-
nation of an obligation of result with an obligation of means. This combination reinforces 
the authority of international courts, but it also can be seen as strengthening domestic 
courts, at least if one considers that international court judgments are typically imple-
mented domestically by the other branches of government. If those branches have little 
room for maneuver in implementing such judgments, there is no choice but to expand the 
powers of local courts in the way indicated. 
Availability of remedies. The ECHRhas much less discretion than the lACHR when it comes 
to ordering remedies.280 The lACHR has made good use of its powers. In Apitz Barbera, for 
instance, the lACHR ordered Venezuela to approve within a year a bill already circulating in 
parliament (on a code of judicial ethics), 281 an order reiterated in Reveron Trujillo.282 This latter 
case also stated that Venezuela needed to change its norms and practices on the free removal 
of provisional judges.283 A couple of years later, after the code of judicial ethics had been 
approved by the parliament, the lACHR addressed its implementation in Chocron Chocron and 
required the legislation to be implemented "as soon as possible" in order to guarantee judicial 
275 See, e.g., Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36, paras. 281- 84; LOpez Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48, paras. 
226-28; Chocr6n Chocr6n v. Venezuela, supra note 110, paras. 164-72. 
276 See, e.g., Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44; Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, para. 72; Grieves v. United 
Kingdom, supra note 85, para. 72. 
277 See, e.g., Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133; Volkovv. Ukraine, supra 
note 101, para. 122. 
278 Volkovv. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 109-17. 
279 See also Anja Seibert-Fohr, European Perspective on the Rule of Law and Independent Courts, 20 J. FUR 
RECHTSPOLITIK 161, 166 (2012) (arguing, regarding judicial councils, that the problem with the Council of 
Europe's recent pronouncements is that they have gradually shifted the emphasis from obligations of results to obli-
gations of means). 
280 See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw (2d ed. 2006). But 
see Helfer, supra note 17, at 146-49. 
281 Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Administrative Disputes") v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 253. 
282 Rever6n Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 191. 
283 Id., para. 193. 
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independence, impartiality, and stability.284 By contrast, the ECHR has been, at least in 
the past, more deferential to states. 285 The ECHR's judicial design rulings discussed in part 
I were declaratory and demanded financial compensation, but the Court imposed no 
explicit requirement that states adjust their domestic practices, even if the Court expected 
that that would happen.286 More recently, however, the ECHR has introduced the con-
cept of pilot judgments and started to require far-reaching remedies such as, in Volkov, the 
comprehensive legislative reform of the system of disciplining judges, as well as the rein-
statement of a dismissed judge.287 Only time will tell whether this bold remedy marks a 
shift in the ECHR's remedy policy or is a mere exception to the rule. Under any circum-
stances, the gap between the remedial powers of the two courts seems smaller now,288 
which is a sign that the power of these two courts is increasing. 
Reach ofjudicial design cases. The judicial design cases discussed in part I show that the ECHR 
influences the judiciaries not only of developing democracies but also of developed ones. In 
fact, ECHR judgments have had especially strong implications for the judiciaries in established 
democracies. For instance, the Court's case law on military courts has forced the United King-
dom to revamp the structure ofits military courts289 and has changed the understanding of the 
concept oflaw in France and other civil-law jurisdictions.290 But this is just the tip of the ice-
berg. Beyond the cases discussed in part I, the ECHR has, among other things, required the 
Netherlands to allow full judicial review of the Crown's administrative decisions,291 ordered 
francophone countries to revise the role of advocates general in the Conseil d' etat and the Cour 
de cassation,292 and triggered the transformation of the House of Lords' Appellate Com-
mittee into the UK Supreme Court. 293 All of these judgments involve far-reaching changes 
that go beyond the remedy for a violation in an individual case. The ECHRhas also showed 
little deference toward European transitional and developing democracies. It forced Tur-
key to abolish its national security courts and remodel its military judiciary;294 required 
Croatia, Turkey, and Ukraine to revise the powers and composition of judicial councils;295 
and prompted Poland and Romania to revise the role of their special judicial officers.296 
Unlike the ECHR, the IACHR has jurisdiction mostly over countries still considered to 
284 Chocr6n Chocr6n v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 163. 
285 Huneeus, supra note 2, at 24. 
286 But note that this practice has begun to change toward more specific requirements for compliance. See Valerio 
Colandrea, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: Some 
Remarks in Lightofthe Assanidze, Broniowski andSejdovic Cases, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 396 (2007); Huneeus, supra 
note 2, at 24. 
287 See notes 259 -262 and accompanying text. 
288 See note 275 and accompanying text. 
289 See Findlayv. United Kingdom, supra note 78; Morris v. United Kingdom, supra note 80; Grieves v. United 
Kingdom, supra note 85. 
290 See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text. 
291 See Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) paras. 32-44 (1985) (Grand Chamber); see also P. van 
Dijk, The Benthem Case and Its Aftermath in the Netherlands, 34 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 5 (1987). 
292 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra note 22. 
294 Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68; ~ahiner v. Turkey, supra note 74. 
295 Olujic v. Croatia, supra note 101; Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101. 
296 Urban v. Poland, supra note 206; Luka v. Romania, supra note 202. 
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be maturing or developing democracies.297 Control of conventionality is once again the 
. key to developing those democracies, as far as the lACHR is concerned. Therefore, the 
maturity of democracy does not playa significant role298 in the level of deference afforded 
by either the ECHR or IACHR. Their judicial design requirements are equally applicable 
to old and new democracies. What appears to be at stake here is a desire to promote stron-
ger judiciaries both as an end in itself and as part of a broader human rights mandate. For 
these human rights courts, institution building is not a subsidiary matter.299 It is a pro-
active engagement with judicial design-an engagement that strengthens domestic insti-
tutions while strengthening the international courts themselves. 
To summarize our discussion of the domestic judicial design cases decided by the ECHR and 
IACHR: the most numerous applicants are judges; these judges employ a broad array of substantive 
articles of both the European and American Conventions as "vehicles" to advance their interests; 
both courts gradually narrowed the margin of appreciation for states parties to implement the 
courts' judgments and to restructure their judiciaries; both courts have recently prescribed bold 
nonpecuniary remedies requiring wide-scale judicial reforms30o and the reinstatement ofjudges;301 
and the maturity of a state's democracy plays no demonstrable role in the level of deference afforded 
by the ECHR and lACHR regarding judicial design. All of these features reinforce the power of 
domestic courts or the international courts, and sometimes both. 
Regarding the substantive areas of domestic judicial design discussed in part I, the 
ECHR and IACHR largely converge regarding the first two sets of issues: military courts 
and other special tribunals, and the disciplining and removal of judges. Both the ECHR 
and IACHR conceptualize a judiciary broadly when compared to states' domestic concep-
tualizations, and both coutts, by expanding standards originally applicable to the judi-
ciary, narrowly constructed, to quasi-judicial bodies, have severely limited states parties' 
choices regarding institutional design of military courts, quasi-judicial bodies, and judicial 
councils. Both courts have also strengthened the protections for ordinary judges and other 
judicial officers against disciplinary motions and removal, especially by bodies composed 
even in part of nonjudges. As a consequence, human rights courts not only determine 
whether a certain disciplinary or dismissal procedure was in accordance with the relevant 
convention but also have the power to specify the appropriate authority for hearing a given 
297 But see the caveat supra note 23. 
298 It. v.:0u~d.be wr~m~ to infer, however, that the maturity of democracy does not play any role in adjudicating 
domesnc Jud1Clal deSIgn Issu.es, at least before the ~C!'1~' For ins~ance, Atala Riffi: v. Chile, supra note 154, suggests 
that the IA:=HR was less speCIfic and more deferentIal m ItS remedIal powers to ChIle, an Organisation for Economic 
Co-operatIOn and Development member, than to Peru, as in Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44, or Constitutional 
Court v. Peru, supra note 31. 
299 On subsidiarity ir: international human rights law, see Paolo Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
InternattonalHuman Rights Law, 97 AJIL 38 (2003), and Gerald Neuman, Subsidiarity, in THE OXFORD HAND-
~OOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 360 (Dinah Shelton ed., 20l3). On subsidiarity in interna-
tronallaw more generally, see Andreas Follesdal, Principle of Subsidiarity as a ConstitutionalPrinciple in International 
Law, 2 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (20 l3) and Markus J achtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global 
G~ver:zance, 79 LAw & CON~EMP. PROB~. (forthcoming 20 16). For the foundations and scope of the subsidiarity 
prInCIple, see Jonathan Chaplm, Subsldlarzty: The Concept and the Connections, 4 ETHICAL PERSP. 117 (1997) and 
Andreas Follesdal, Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 231 (1998). 
300 That said, the IACHR is still more proactive. 
301 See Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 208; Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Administrative Disputes") 
v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 246. 
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case domestically.302 The only area in which the ECHR and lACHR diverge appears to be 
judicial lawmaking. Whereas the ECHR has elevated judge-made law to be on a par with 
legislation both in common-law and civil-law countries, the lACHR retains a narrower 
understanding of what law is and has restricted extending the concept of law beyond its 
own case law and to a (few and recent) cases involving common-law jurisdictions. This 
difference is relevant for the analysis presented in the following section, which examines 
whether the two courts have their own visions of the optimal domestic judiciary. 
It may seem obvious that as a means of protecting fair trial rights, human rights courts should 
have the prerogative to pass judgment on the way that domestic proceedings are structured. 
However, the consequence of finding a violation of fair trial rights is much more intrusive than 
a mere declaration of noncompliance with a certain provision of a human rights instrument. 
And some commentators, as well as some states, may well say "too intrusive." 
One may also object that some of the ECHR and IACHR judgments discussed in part I are 
best understood as responding to the political pressure to reduce their growing backlogs and 
(especially in Europe) to embrace subsidiarity.303 Neither the ECHR nor the IACHR operates 
in a vacuum without any outside influences, and both courts face rising caseloads .. In Europe, 
the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly have intensively pushed for cases 
to be handled domestically in order to reduce the ECHR's backlog. Moreover, some Council 
of Europe member states have recently put strong emphasis on subsidiarity. This effort cul-
minated in the Brighton Declaration, which sought to add to the European Convention's pre-
amble express reference to the principle of subsidiarity, which many observers interpreted as 
a signal to the ECHR to give greater deference to member states.304 The ECHR thus has a 
strong incentive to empower domestic courts, thereby enabling individuals to seek reliefbefore 
domestic courts rather than the ECHR, and also satisfying the political impetus for more sub-
sidiarity. The doctrine of control of conventionality in the inter-American system of human 
rights is aimed to achieve the same ends, albeit neither the docket nor political emphasis on 
subsidiarity is as heavy as in the European system. 
Notwithstanding the above, the actual consequences of empowering ordinary domestic 
courts to take on, as it were, part of the caseloads of the ECHR and IACHR are not clear, 
and especially in transitional democracies, judiciaries might be a part of the problem, not 
the solution.305 Moreover, as we suggested above, both courts are fairly directive in what 
they expect of national governments regarding domestic judicial design; some of their 
judgments in this area allow for neither "strong" nor "weak" versions of subsidiarity;306 
302 See also M. DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDER-
STANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 125-29 (2008) (noting the development of the human rights 
regime in Europe and its impact on the EU trade regime, constituting a "school of democracies"). 
303 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. 
304 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, para. 
12(b) (Apr. 20, 2012), at http://www.echr.coe.int/DocumentsI2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf; see 
also Laurence Helfer, The Burdens and Benefits o/Brighton, ESIL REFLECTIONS a une 8, 2012), at http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/node/138; Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present and 
Future o/the European Court o/Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW 
AND POLITICS (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael RaskMadsen eds., 2013); Sarah Lambrecht, Reforms to Lessen the 
Influence o/the European Court o/Human Rights: A Successfol Strategy?, 21 EUR. PUB. L. 257 (2015). 
305 We discuss this issue in the section "The Quest for an Ideal or Minimal Judiciary?" in part II. 
306 Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, supra note 299, observe that at least two versions of subsidiarity can be identified: 
a "weak" version characterized by "a presumption for the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome 
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and many ECHR judgments had been decided long before the Brighton process began. 
. Hence, the recent emphasis on subsidiarity and the political pressure for the courts to 
reduce their caseloads cannot explain the courts' efforts to regulate and reshape domestic 
judiciaries. Some other dynamic must be at work. The obvious question is: do those judg-
ments, taken cumulatively, amount to something akin to a clear judicial archetype? The 
next section explores this possibility. 
The Quest for an Ideal or Minimaljudiciary? 
The previous section showed that despite some differences in their views, both the ECHR 
and lACHR have sometimes interfered with domestic judicial design and imposed significant 
burdens on states that want to comply with their judgments. The focus of this section is to con-
nect the three sets of domestic judicial issues discussed in part I and to inquire whether one or 
both of these courts has a broader normative agenda. More specifically, do the ECHR and 
IACHR have a view on what "the optimal judiciary" should look like, and to what extent do 
they push this view in their case law? As we suggested above, if these courts do have an agenda 
in mind, it is likely to be one that strengthens domestic judiciaries and has the consequence 
(unintended or otherwise) of also strengthening the courts themselves. 
The ECHR and IACHRhave laid a strong groundwork for the design of an optimal judi-
ciary. This is not to say that they have necessarily done so with such a goal in mind or that 
they have had a master agenda spanning several decades and continents. Nevertheless, we 
argue that elements that have organically emerged from the two courts' case law, once sys-
tematized, show that they have been molding the design of national judiciaries toward 
their preferred model. 
The standard requirement of a national judiciary is that judicial recourse must be prompt, 
impartial, independent, and before a competent judge whose court has been in existence prior 
to the facts of the dispute being heard. The term judge here is to be understood broadly since 
bodies other than courts (staffed by judges) are subject to the same requirements, as long as they 
are in a position to make determinations about the legal rights ofindividuals.307 Additionally, 
these judges need to be subject to control and external review, and, no matter who or what body 
is exercising this control or in the position to discipline and remove judges, that body must 
abide by the same principles as the traditional judiciary.30B And according at least to the 
IACHR's Constitutional Court case, constitutional or high court justices have a special status 
that needs to be acknowledged.309 Taken together, the above represents a fairly general, easily 
agreeable set of principles that are correspond decently well to the elements one can infer from 
reading the texts of the conventions that the ECHR and IACHR enforce. We may call it a min-
imal judicial design. 
by any reason that makes action on a higher level appear as advantageous," and a "strong" version characterized "by 
a high threshold-a presumption that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases." 
307 See the cases discussed in the section "Military Courts and Special Tribunals" in part 1, especially the follow-
ing: YAT AMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, L6pezMendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48, Belilos v. Switzerland, supra 
note 99, and Sramek v. Austria, supra note 99. 
308 Constitutional Courtv. Peru, supra note 31; Chocr6n Chocr6n v. Venezuela, supra note 110; Olujicv. Cro-
atia, supra note 101; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101; Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36. 
309 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, para. 75. 
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The ECHR and the IACHR, however, have gone far beyond these general principles. First, 
both courts consistently note that, should there be a conflict between general and specialized 
jurisdictions, preference should be given to the one more closely connected to the case at hand, 
with a strong preference for general courts, and with little regard to other state priorities (such 
as national security, in the example of the terrorism cases). Consequently, the "optimal judi-
ciary" either should not include military courts or national security courts, or at least should 
limit the jurisdiction of such courts to selected crimes committed by military personneI,3lO 
Second, both the ECHR and IACHR de facto prohibit the impeachment of judges. The 
IACHR does so because it requires political bodies deciding on impeachment to be bound by 
the same rules as any judicial body when it comes to fair trial rights-which is a condition that 
no political body can meet. 311 The ECHR has also suggested that parliamentarians do not have 
the legal and judicial experience deemed necessary for determining complex issues of fact and 
law in individual disciplinary cases.312 Similarly, it found that retention-review mecha-
nisms,313 such as the reappointment of judges by political actors after a fixed term of office, 
violate the European Convention.314 
Third, both courts, apart from discarding impeachment as an acceptable mechanism for remov-
ing judges, also further govern who can discipline judges. In Volkov, in particular, the ECHR went 
beyond minimal design to require the following: judges must constitute at least 50 percent of the 
members of any disciplinary body; these judicial members of the disciplinary body must be elected 
by their peers; nonjudicial members of the disciplinary body must work on that body full time so 
as to avoid dependence on their primary employers; and the prosecutor general cannot sit on a dis-
ciplinary body.315 Imposing this design on a domestic judicial body is tantamount to microman-
agement. From the perspective of institutional design, the Volkov requirements, read together, 
exclude participation of virtually any politicians in the disciplinary body and question the partic-
ipation of many categories of civil servants, including prosecutors who traditionally sit on judicial 
councils together with judges. Moreover, by imposing the Volkov requirements on judicial councils, 
the ECHR also indicated, in effect, the optimal composition of judicial councils and advocated for 
the strong model for such bodies based on the Italian Consiglio superiore de la magistratura. 316 The 
IACHR's requirements on the composition of disciplinary bodies follow much the same model: its 
310 For IACHR cases see Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44, para. 194, and the cases cited supra note 43. For 
ECH~ cases, see Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, paras. 67-72, Maszni v. Romania, supra note 67, para. 51, Morris 
v. Unzted Kzngdom, supra note 80, paras. 70-72, Cooper v. United Kingdom, supra note 84, paras. 123-24, and 
Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, paras. 80-89. All of the cases referred to in this footnote are discussed 
in the section "Military Courts and Special Tribunals" in part I. 
311 See Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, paras. 75-78; Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et 
al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133, para. 207. 
312 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 122. 
313 By "ret~ntion-review me~ha~isms" we m~an any mechanism of reappointment or reelection of judges. In 
other w?rds, If a state .opts for lImIted terms of Judges and allows a renewal of that term, it stipulates a retention 
mechamsm. See Brandice Canes-W rone, Tom S. Clark & J ee-Kwang Park,Judicial Independence and Retention Elec-
tions, 28 J. L. ECON. ORG. 211 (2012) (how retention mechanisms work in the United States). 
314 See, e.g., Wille v. Liechtenstein, supra note 34; Gurov v. Moldova, App. No. 36455/02, para. 34 (Eut. Ct. 
H.R. July 11, 2006); Fatullayevv.Azerbaijan, App. No. 40984/07, paras. 143-46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 22,2010). 
315 Volkovv. Ukraine, supra note 10 1, paras. 109 -17; see also Ozpinarv. Turkey, supra note 36; Olujie v. Croatia, 
supra note 101. All three of these case are discussed in more detail in the section "Removal and Disciplining of 
Judges" in part 1. 
316 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
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members must be independent, capable of recusing themselves, become members through an ade-
quate nomination procedure, and have their stability in the position guaranteed. All of these param-
eters have in set out in other, nondisciplinary cases, and a dear consequence is that politicians should 
not serve on bodies to discipline judges unless those politicians are capable as behaving as judges 
themselves.317 
Fourth, an implication the ECHR and IACHR case law on quasi-judicial bodies is that virtually 
all aspects of public life, including deeply political questions such as election results, must be jus-
ticiable, which means that a court is considered the most appropriate forum to decide these issues. 
Both courts leave little room, if any, for a royal prerogative318 or a political question doctrine.319 
Even special constitutional organs, such as electoral councils320 and judicial councils,321 must be 
subject to judicial review. This judicialization of new areas oflaw significantly shifts the domestic 
separation of powers, as it empowers the judiciary at the expense of the political branches. 
Fifth, the requirements of the ECHRand IACHRon judicial design have the effect offurther 
entrenching judicial decisions in domestic legal systems, with the further consequence of 
attributing to judges some capacity for making law themselves. For the ECHR, this process has 
advanced more quickly, as the Court has openly elevated domestic case law to be among the 
primary sources oflaw.322 The IACHR is more conservative in this respect and treats only its 
own judgments, not the decisions of domestic courts, as on a par with legislation.323 Never-
theless, even this partial acknowledgment of judicial lawmaking encroaches up'on the prerog-
atives of domestic parliaments and undermines the centrality of parliamentary legislation in 
civil-law systems. It also strengthens the powers of international courts at the expense of domes-
tic bodies-with implications for the legitimacy of these courts. 
In sum, the ECHR and IACHR tend to prioritize ordinary professional judges and are skep-
tical regarding the inclusion of politicians, military judges, and other nonjudges on specialized 
courts. The courts also transfer decision-making powers to the ordinary judiciary via the judi-
cialization of new areas oflaw and shield the judiciary from accountability by anyone other than 
their peers. What drives the ECHR and the IACHR in this direction is not entirely clear from 
the case law, but the changes do have the consequence of increasing the power of domestic 
courts and consequently of the international courts themselves, which gain" a key regional con-
stituency."324 Doctrines like the control of conventionality provide domestic judges with an 
incentive to rely on international courts as a protection against unstable regimes that rely too 
much on presidential powers, as in the Constitutional Court and Apitz Barbera cases against 
Peru and Venezuela, respectively.325 The international human rights court becomes a shield 
317 Apitz Barbera ("First Court of Administrative Disputes") v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 253. 
318 See Benthem v. Netherlands, supra note 291. 
319 See IACHR judgments in YAT AMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, and Lopez Mendoza v. Venezue/4, supra note 48. 
320 See YATAMA v, Nicaragua, supra note 46, and Lopez Mendoza v, Venezuela, supra note 48. 
321 See Ozpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36; Olujie v. Croatia, supra note 101; Volkovv. Ukraine, supra note 101. 
322 See Kruslin v. France, supra note 217; Leyla ~ahin v. Turkey, supra note 220; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. 
Netherlands, supra note 220. 
323 See AlmonacidArellano v. Chile, supra note 235, para. 124; see also Boyce v. Barbados, supra note 240, para. 
78; Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados, supra note 243, Sep. Op. Garda Ramirez,]., para. 12 (the early signs ofacknowl-
edgment of judicial decisions as law in the first common-law cases before the IACHR). 
324 Huneeus, supra note 11, at 526. 
325 Walter F. Camota, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Conventionality Control 29 (July 24, 
2012), at https:llssm.com/abstract=2116599, 
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that protects and strengthens domestic judiciaries, while also increasing its own relevance in 
domestic law (and often politics). The more stringent standards imposed by the courts force 
many states to abandon their traditional legal and judicial structures and to revise their con-
ceptions of the separation of powers. 
The ongoing extension of competence by the ECHR and IACHR enables them to impose 
far-reaching institutional changes on the domestic level, but it also puts the courts' legitimacy 
and credibility at risk, and even creates a strain on them. To the extent that the courts are now 
engaged in institutional design, they need to have a much more concrete understanding of the 
relevant state's "framework of government" as defined by domestic constitutionalla~26 and 
also of states parties' constitutional history- both of which lead the courts far beyond the 
application of international law. And because the courts suddenly need this new expertise, they 
need to seek it out in the form of special appointments, potentially giving those individuals 
unusual influence that may be neither reviewed nor critiqued. These domestic legal incursions 
having constitutional dimensions may also potentially shift the courts away from their core 
mission of international human rights and toward the role ofwhar is essentially a constitutional 
court outside the national constitutional system-one that is consequently not even subject 
to the checks and balances required in domestic constitutional law. As a result, the legitimacy 
gap-a democratic deficit-is likely to be further widened and may even counteract the 
entrenchment benefits that arise from the courts' engagement with national courts through 
mechanisms like control of conventionality. Privileging domestic judicial branches over other 
branches of government may also undercut legitimacy if the executive, usually with broader 
foreign affairs prerogatives, decides to defy or even denounce the system. 
Two more dangers loom large as the ECHR and IACHR effectively increase the power of 
domestic courts. First, in transitional democracies, judges are often a part of the problem, not 
the solution. Judges are often conservative and a part of the establishment,327 and under dic~ 
tatorships and Communist rule, the judiciary is often purged of judges who can be seen as "too 
progressive" or "anti-regime."328 Those judges who stay on the bench have often collaborated 
with totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.329 Even after the fall of such regimes, judges usually 
manage to resist significant purges,330 with the consequence that at least during the early 
decades after political transition, the ECHR and IACHR have to partner mainly with judges 
from the previous regime. 
326 More~ver, ~s several scholars have argued, there is far less convergence on separation-of-powers issues than 
on human nghts Issues among the members of the Council of Europe and Organization of American States. See, 
e.g., VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 53, 59, ch. 8 (2009) (see 
also pages 53 and 67); Kosar, supra note 12, at 58, 
327 See, e.g., HILBINK, supra note 190. 
328 See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Maria Maldonado, The judiciary in Political Transitions: The Critical Role ofU.S. 
Constitutionalism in Latin America, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L. & COMPo L. 593 (on Latin America); BENJAMIN 
FROMMER, NATIONAL CLEANSING: RETRIBUTION AGAINST NAZI COLLABORATORS IN POSTWAR CZECHO-
SLOVAKIA 328,333-34 (2005) (on Czechoslovakia). 
329 See, e.g., DYZENHAUS, supra note 190; HILBINK, supra note 190; YUSUF, supra note 190. 
330 See DYZENHA~S, supra note 190; HILBINK, supra note 190; YUSUF, supra note 190. The widespread purge 
of German DemocratIc Republic judges afte! the reunification of Germany was unusual. See Erhard Blankenburg, 
The Purge of Lawyers After the Breakdown oj the East German Communist Regime, 20 LAw & SOc. INQUIRY 223, 
240-41 (1995), and more generally, David Kosar, The Least Accountable Branch, 11 INT'L J. CONST. L. 234, 
250-55 (2013). 
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More generally, several European and Latin American judiciaries suffer from widespread 
corruption.331 In such an environment, vesting in the judiciary the role of disciplining judges 
might not be the best idea.332 But that is exactly what the ECHR and IACHR suggest be done. 
For judicial discipline, both courts are imposing one-size-fits-all solutions that are not sensitive 
to local conditions.333 Similarly, by pushing a particular model of judicial council, especially 
in stages of transition, the ECHR has fetishized judicial independence without recognizing 
that doing so may perpetuate existing problems. 334 Imposing a nominally ideal judicial design 
actually entails a serious risk for domestic judges in the long term. As the literature on judicial 
reputation shows, allowing corrupt judges to remain in office may risk the collective reputation 
of the judiciary, ultimately undermining judicial independence.335 
A second danger is tied in with the diversity of domestic judiciaries; they are not monolithic 
blocs. 336 The ECHR and IACHR often have to choose which judges they empower. When they 
increase the power of lower court judges vis-a.-vis their superiors,337 they inevitably weaken 
those superiors. When that happens, the judiciary no longer speaks with a single voice, and legal 
certainty is endangered.338 A long strand of scholarship shows how European supranational 
courts, by forging alliances with lower courts, have alienated top ordinary courts339 and under-
mined the role of domestic constitutional courts, the key guardians of fundamental rights and 
the rule of law.340 The control of conventionality doctrine-which, according to the Almo-
nacid case, granted the power to exercise conventionality control to all judges341-;-may poten-
tially have the same effect in Latin America. 
Therefore, the empowerment of domestic judiciaries does not yield straightforward results. 
Well-intentioned as they may be, the ECHR and IACHR may be treading murky waters when 
they interfere with domestic judicial design, and it remains to be seen what unintended con-
sequences the courts' actions have within the states parties. Yet again, the only certain bene-
ficiaries of this empowerment are the regional human rights courts themselves. 
331 See, e.g., Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 POL'y STUD. 273 (1996); 
Maria Popova, Why the Bulgarian judiciary Does Not Prosecute Corruption?, 59 PROBS. POST COMMUNISM 35 
(2012) (on Bulgaria); Kathryn Hendley, 'Telephone Law' and the 'Rule ofLaw~' The Russian Case, 1 HAGUE J. ON 
RULE L. 241, 252-53 (2009) (on Russia); Cristina Parau, The Drive for judicial Supremacy, in JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE IN TRANSITION 619, 639-43, 649-56 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012) (on Romania). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed the phenomenon of international human rights courts engaging 
in domestic judicial design. It shows that the judgments of the ECHR and IACHR, rather than 
having effects only with respect to the individual whose rights have been violated, have much 
deeper structural effects in the design and operation of domestic judicial structures. We have 
argued that this phenomenon has gone somewhat unnoticed but has deep implications for the. 
entrenchment and effectiveness of international law within domestic regimes. This entrench-
ment happens in no small part because both courts have carved central roles for themselves in 
building domestic law and institutions-which contributes to their status spearheading con-
stitutionalist projects for their respective regions. 
Most importantly, we have seen here that the ECHR and IACHR have a broader under-
standing of judicial power than some states parties and that this broader understanding has 
contributed to the judicialization of new areas oflaw. By empowering courts at the expense of 
other political institutions within the state and by challenging the primacy of the legislature in 
lawmaking, the courts have also shifted the domestic separation of powers. Finally, the ECHR 
and IACHR have affected the internal architecture of domestic judiciaries as the courts grad-
ually endorse the unification of court administration and change the power structures within 
the judiciary (for example, by giving more significant roles to lower court judges). While many 
of these mechanisms enhance the domestic entrenchment of international human rights norms 
and, in particular, make these human rights courts' activities more relevant domestically, they 
can also have unintended consequences. Of special note are the widening legitimacy gaps of 
the ECHR and IACHR as their mandates evolve from overseeing international law to becoming 
new constitutional organs that operate outside the constraints of domestic constitutions. 
